Slide 1The Civil War- Ending Limited War Strategic Overview 1862:Strategic Reassessment & ChangeBattle Map Overview- Civil War 1861-62Battle Map Overview- Eastern Theater 1861-62:McClellan’s Peninsula CampaignPeninsula Campaign- Strategy & TacticsPeninsula Campaign- Deployment:Engagements: Yorktown to Seven Pines:Battle of Yorktown- Decision to AbandonBattle of Yorktown- South’s resistance stiffensMac Splits his ArmyBattle of Seven Pines (Fair Oaks)Shenandoah Valley- PreludeJackson & Shenandoah Valley CampaignShenandoah Valley- Strategy & TacticsShenandoah Valley- ExecutionShenandoah Valley- ResultsFailure of North’s Limited StrategySeven Days Battle SeriesSeven Days- Strategy & TacticsSeven Days- MechanicsvilleSeven Days- Gaines MillSeven Days- Lost OpportunitiesSeven Days- ResultsConfederate Counterstrokes & North’s reversal of fortunesSecond Manassas- Strategy & TacticsSecond Manassas (2nd Bull Run)Second Manassas- ExecutionSecond Manassas- Longstreet AttacksSecond Manassas- ResultsBattle of Antietam (Sharpsburg)- DispositionsBattle of Antietam- Strategy & TacticsAntietam- Campaign Plan & DeploymentBattle of Antietam - ExecutionBattle of Antietam – Tactical Interior LinesBattle of Antietam- ResultsBattle of Fredericksburg - PreludeBattle of Fredericksburg- Strategy & TacticsBattle of Fredericksburg- Execution & DisasterAssessment: Stalemate & Contributing FactorsAssessment –Toward Total WarBack-up SlidesWestern TheaterBattle of Stones River (Murfreesboro)Grant’s Overland Campaign to Vicksburg1MH-5: The Civil War-Ending Limited WarThe Civil War- Ending Limited WarStrategic Overview 1862: 2•North achieved several notable victories by June 1862:–Border States secure in North’s camp–Lower Mississippi & New Orleans captured–West & Middle Tennessee held–Strategically important Corinth captured without a shot•Then fortunes (friction) of war changed:–South countered w/aggressive & unexpected offensives–Threat became centered closer to Washington–Southern forces in West also struck back–McClellan’s “Grand” Peninsula strategy falteredStrategic Reassessment & Change•As Result: brief war appears more & more unlikely–North begins to reassess its Limited War Strategy–Growing doubts prompt several changes…•One change is in organization & unit structure:–Both sides adopt corps system for control of troops•More independent fighting wings of 3 or more divisions–Begin to fight more in classic Napoleonic style of Europe3Battle Map Overview- Civil War 1861-624Battle Map Overview- Eastern Theater 1861-62:5McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign •Commanders’ strengths & weaknesses:–George B. McClellan rebuilt Army of Potomac•Great organizer w/charisma but extremely cautious•Dearly loved by troops as a caring commander–Leaves Lincoln with impression of action •Delay in reality; also his ego strains relationship–Joe Johnston: competent & resourceful•But also cautious and prone to readily retreat when in doubt•Force dispositions (actual & perceived):–McClellan: 100K effectives vs. –Joe Johnston’s 40K–Pinkerton’s Intel convinced “Little Mac” that the South had 150K men•Overestimates of enemy strength reinforced cautious commander view 6Peninsula Campaign- Strategy & Tactics•Strategic, Operational, & Tactical Objectives –Mac: end war by “A Single Grand Campaign”•Build up Union forces & conduct end run around Johnston•Strike South’s “center of gravity” and end war•Plans & preparation:–Johnston’s “150K” troops occupy Centerville •Following South’s victory at Bull Run–Mac initially wanted to deploy troops to Urbana•Then march 50 miles to Richmond and lay siege•Johnston’s redeployment & its impact:–Mac’s Plan modified because of Johnson’s recent & unexpected move from Centerville to central Virginia–New plan required as a result: deploy to Fort Monroe •(75 miles further from where?)7Peninsula Campaign- Deployment:•Mac 1st conducts shake down march to Centerville–Becomes obvious to all that Intel picture dead wrong•“Quaker cannons” & other indications=> no 150K possible•Mac looses credibility with Lincoln & the Public–Relations between two become more strained & Mac is demoted•Union deployment to Fort Monroe:–Hugh maritime lift required to deploy Union forces•Major amphibious operation: 113 steamers & 276 small craft•Transport 121,500 troops, 14K horses & mules•1224 wagons & 200 cannon for siege operation –(Mac’s preferred tactic)–Contact limited: caution and classic siege warfare8Engagements: Yorktown to Seven Pines:•Battle of Yorktown- Map overview:–McClellan's inland advance stalled 4 April 1862–MG Magruder successfully delays Mac’s operational progress–Rebel defensive line of forts across Peninsula to James river9Battle of Yorktown- Decision to Abandon•Meanwhile Lincoln becomes concerned the capitol is vulnerable–Holds back McDowell's I corps •Reduces Mac’s Peninsula Campaign’s Order of Battle (OB)–Impact on the cautious McClellan?•Johnston: sees Yorktown as inevitable loss –(Mac’s heavy siege cannon will defeat his forces trying to hold)–Notifies Davis of his intent to abandon Yorktown10(Vigorously protests)Battle of Yorktown- South’s resistance stiffens •Significant strategic costs of this move: –Opens York & James rivers to Federal Navy–Union Navy gunboats now able to position for operational & fire support for Army–Also South forced to abandon Norfolk & its Naval Yard•Scuttle CSS Virginia•Davis even considers abandoning Richmond–Lee argues strongly against Capitol’s abandonment –Convinces Davis to hold on•Then South’s resistance stiffens –Rebels able to turn back Federal Navy at James river•As McClellan finally closes in on Richmond…–Decides to conduct formal siege –Brings up heavy siege cannon & settles in for classic siege•Required to use railroad spur to transport his siege guns11Mac Splits his Army•So Mac locates main supply base at White House Landing –Base of supply is situated on Pamunkey river (R. Lee’s house)–Forced to split his forces North & South of Chickahominy river •Two Thirds to the North & One Third to the South of the river–Rationale: Use position to flank Rebel left, protect RR spur for siege, &