Article Contentsp. [475]p. 476p. 477p. 478p. 479p. 480p. 481p. 482p. 483p. 484Issue Table of ContentsPolity, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Spring, 1993), pp. 329-495Front MatterThinking about Reform: The World View of Congressional Reformers [pp. 329 - 354]David Hume on the Philosophic Underpinnings of Interest Group Politics [pp. 355 - 374]The 1989 Basic Program of the German Social Democratic Party [pp. 375 - 399]Political Amateurism, Legislative Inexperience, & Incumbency Behavior: Southern Republican Senators, 1980-1986 [pp. 401 - 420]Private Conscience & Public Order: Hobbes & "The Federalist" [pp. 421 - 443]Beyond Instrumental Politics: The New Institutionalism, Legal Rhetoric, & Judicial Supremacy [pp. 445 - 459]CommentaryThe 1992 Elections & the Future of American Politics [pp. 461 - 474]Research NoteDivided We Govern? A Reassessment [pp. 475 - 484]Reply: Let's Stick with the Longer List [pp. 485 - 488]Response: Let's Stick with the Larger Question [pp. 489 - 490]CorrespondenceA Response to Mark P. Petracca's Article "Predisposed to Oppose: Political Scientists & Term Limitations" [pp. 491 - 493]Reply from Mark P. Petracca [pp. 493 - 495]Back MatterDivided We Govern? A ReassessmentAuthor(s): Sean Q. KellySource: Polity, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Spring, 1993), pp. 475-484Published by: Palgrave Macmillan JournalsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3234975Accessed: 24/08/2009 14:01Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. 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For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected] Macmillan Journals is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Polity.http://www.jstor.orgResearch Note Divided We Govern? A Reassessment* Sean Q Kelly, East Carolina University The defining characteristic of American politics in the post-World War II era is the dominance of divided partisan control of American political institutions. Congress and the presidency have been controlled, in some combination, by different political parties for twenty-eight of the last forty-six years. And, in the last twenty years, the presidency, the House and the Senate have been controlled by the same party for only four years. Despite this dramatic pattern, relatively little systematic research has sought to assess the impact of divided government on the governing capacity of the American political system.' David Mayhew's Divided We Govern is one exception.2 Challenging the "conventional wisdom" that *This research was supported by the Department of Political Science and the Center for the Study of American Politics at the University of Colorado at Boulder, and the Depart- ment of Political Science at East Carolina University. The author thanks Larry Dodd, Lonna Atkeson, Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, Rodney Hero, Cal Jillson, Ted Lowi, Steve Majstorovic, David Mayhew, Vince McGuire, Will Moore, Randall Partin, Sheen Rajmaira, Maury Simon, Walt Stone, and Bob Thompson for their help in preparing this research note. 1. Some of the more important works that examine the consequences of divided gov- ernment are: Gary W. Cox and Matthew D. McCubbins, "Control of Fiscal Policy," in The Politics of Divided Government, ed. Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 155-78; Morris P. Fiorina, Divided Government (New York: Macmillan, 1992); Samuel Kernell, "Facing an Opposition Congress: The President's Strategic Circumstance," in The Politics of Divided Government, pp. 87-112; Matthew D. McCubbins, "Government on Lay-Away: Federal Spending and Deficits Under Divided Party Control," in The Politics of Divided Government, pp. 113-54; Mark P. Petracca, Lonce Bailey, and Pamela Smith, "Proposals for Constitutional Reform: An Evaluation of the Committee on the Constitutional System," Presidential Studies Quarterly (Summer 1990): 503-32; Mark P. Petracca, "Divided Government and the Risks of Constitutional Reform," PS: Political Science & Politics (December 1991): 634-37; James A. Thurber, "Representation, Accountability, and Efficiency in Divided Party Control of Govern- ment," PS: Political Science & Politics (December 1991): 653-57. 2. David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investiga- tions, 1946-1990 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991). Polity Volume XXV, Number 3 Spring 1993 Volume XXV, Number 3 Spring 1993 Polity476 Research Note strong one-party control is necessary to produce significant public policy,3 Mayhew presents evidence that partisan control of government does not have a significant negative effect on the formulation of "inno- vative policy."4 Mayhew's careful analysis of data collected from various primary and secondary sources leads him to conclude that the emergence of innovative legislation is more directly linked to the timing of legisla- tion (it is more likely to be enacted in the first two years of a presidential term) and to the public mood (innovative policy is more likely to emerge when there is a public demand for an activist government). Thus, Mayhew concludes, "unified versus divided control has probably not made a notable difference during the postwar era."5 Mayhew's empirical analysis fuels an emerging sentiment within polit- ical science that divided party government does not affect the governing capacity of the American system,6 thereby standing over a century of scholarship on its head. From Woodrow Wilson7 to James MacGregor Burns,8 to Barbara Sinclair9 and David Brady,10 the conventional wisdom