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Ch16PLN

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Chapter 16: Financial Distress, Managerial Incentives, and InformationI. Basic Ideas1.=>2.=>3.=>4.=>=>II. The Costs of Bankruptcy and Financial DistressNote: In perfect markets, bankruptcy does not affect capital structure decisionsReason: creditors simply take control of the firm=> no loss of value=> no cost=> need to look at cash flows that go to someone besides stockholders and creditors in bankruptcyA. Direct Costs of BankruptcyDirect costs:Primary source of costs:Ex.Results of studies of average cost as a percent of pre-bankruptcy value:B. Indirect Costs of Financial DistressIndirect costs:Notes:1)2) difficult to measureExamples:Results of studies of indirect financial distress costs:C. Expected Financial Distress CostsE(Financial Distress Costs) = probability of distress x financial distress costsNotes:1) Probability of distress increases with:a)b)2)III. Agency and DebtAgency: conflicts of interest within the firmA. Stockholder-Bondholder Conflict and the Agency Cost of DebtNote: all of the following issues are more significant if the firm is in financial distress1. Excessive Risk TakingBasic idea:Reason:1) Bondholder claim:=> downside risk:=> upside risk:2) Stockholder claim:=> upside risk:=> downside risk:2. Under-investment in positive NPV projectsBasic idea:Notes:1)=>2)3. Cashing OutBasic idea:Reason:=>=>4. Agency Costs, Covenants, and DebtDebt covenant: agreement in debt contract that places restrictions on the firmRole of debt covenants:Benefit of covenants:Cost of covenants:B. Stockholder-Manager Conflict and the Agency Benefit of DebtKey idea: the interests of managers and owners may not be the same1. Ownership and the Sharing of Benefits and Costsa. Basic ideas1) if the manager is also the owner, the goal of the manager and the goal of the owner is the same=> same person!2) if the manager doesn’t own all of the firm’s stock, there is a potential conflict between the owner and the manager if there is an unequal sharing of the costs and benefits=> almost always the caseb. Types of conflict between owners and managers1) Management Effort:Q: Who bears the cost of management effort?Q: Who gets the benefit of management effort?Q: Will managers want to expend more or less effort than is optimal for stockholders?2) Pay and Perks:Q: Who bears the cost of management pay and perks?Q: Who gets the benefit of management pay and perks?Q: Will managers want more or less pay and perks than is optimal for stockholders?3) Firm diversification:Q: How does company-specific risk impact stockholders?Q: How does company-specific risk impact managers?Q: How does diversification of the firm impact stockholders and managers?Stockholder:Managers:=>Note:4) Empire building:Q: How does the size of the firm impact stockholders?Q: How does the size of the firm impact managers?=>Q: Will managers want a larger firm than stockholders?Note:Free cash flow:2. Debt and owner-manager conflict1)Why important?2)a)b)3)Notes:1) debt may weaken firm so less able to respond to competition2) management may resist debt because don’t like the discipline and reduced job securityIV. The Tradeoff TheoryVL = VU + PV(Interest Tax Shield) – PV(Financial Distress Costs)– PV(Agency Costs of Debt) + PV(Agency Benefits of Debt) (16.3)=> optimal debt maximizes firm valueV. Asymmetric Information and Capital StructureBasic idea: management generally knows more about the firm than outside investorsA. Leverage as a Credible SignalBasic idea:=> signal is credible since costly to send false signal=>B. Adverse Selection1. Key ideas:1) sellers typically know more than buyers about the quality of an item.2) at any given price, those who have low quality goods will be more eager to sell2. Results:1) products available for sale are likely below average quality2) buyers will demand a discount when buyingNote: 1) and 2) feed off each other3. Implications for Equity Issuance1)=>Note:2)Chapter 16: Financial Distress, Managerial Incentives, and Information-1Chapter 16: Financial Distress, Managerial Incentives, and InformationI. Basic Ideas1. => 2. => 3. => 4. => => II. The Costs of Bankruptcy and Financial DistressNote: In perfect markets, bankruptcy does not affect capital structure decisionsReason: creditors simply take control of the firm=> no loss of value=> no cost=> need to look at cash flows that go to someone besides stockholders and creditors in bankruptcyA. Direct Costs of BankruptcyDirect costs: Primary source of costs: Ex. Results of studies of average cost as a percent of pre-bankruptcy value: Corporate FinanceChapter 16: Financial Distress, Managerial Incentives, and Information-2B. Indirect Costs of Financial DistressIndirect costs: Notes: 1) 2) difficult to measureExamples: Results of studies of indirect financial distress costs: C. Expected Financial Distress CostsE(Financial Distress Costs) = probability of distress x financial distress costsNotes:1) Probability of distress increases with: a) b) 2) III. Agency and DebtAgency: conflicts of interest within the firmA. Stockholder-Bondholder Conflict and the Agency Cost of DebtNote: all of the following issues are more significant if the firm is in financial distressCorporate FinanceChapter 16: Financial Distress, Managerial Incentives, and Information-31. Excessive Risk TakingBasic idea: Reason: 1) Bondholder claim: => downside risk: => upside risk: 2) Stockholder claim: => upside risk: => downside risk: 2. Under-investment in positive NPV projectsBasic idea: Notes:1) => 2) 3. Cashing OutBasic idea: Reason: => => Corporate FinanceChapter 16: Financial Distress, Managerial Incentives, and Information-44. Agency Costs, Covenants, and DebtDebt covenant: agreement in debt contract that places restrictions on the firmRole of debt covenants: Benefit of covenants: Cost of covenants: B. Stockholder-Manager Conflict and the Agency Benefit of DebtKey idea: the interests of managers and owners may not be the same1. Ownership and the Sharing of Benefits and Costsa. Basic ideas1) if the manager is also the owner, the goal of the manager and the goal of the owner is the same=> same person!2) if the manager doesn’t own all of the firm’s stock, there is a potential conflict between the owner and the manager if there is an unequal sharing of the costs and benefits=> almost always the caseb. Types of conflict between owners and managers1) Management Effort:Q: Who bears the cost of management effort? Q: Who gets the benefit of management effort? Q: Will managers want to


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