DOC PREVIEW
UW-Madison ECON 301 - Public Goods

This preview shows page 1-2-3-4 out of 12 pages.

Save
View full document
View full document
Premium Document
Do you want full access? Go Premium and unlock all 12 pages.
Access to all documents
Download any document
Ad free experience
View full document
Premium Document
Do you want full access? Go Premium and unlock all 12 pages.
Access to all documents
Download any document
Ad free experience
View full document
Premium Document
Do you want full access? Go Premium and unlock all 12 pages.
Access to all documents
Download any document
Ad free experience
View full document
Premium Document
Do you want full access? Go Premium and unlock all 12 pages.
Access to all documents
Download any document
Ad free experience
Premium Document
Do you want full access? Go Premium and unlock all 12 pages.
Access to all documents
Download any document
Ad free experience

Unformatted text preview:

L23Public Goods -- DefinitionExamples of public goodsPark Size: Market OutcomeA: best response toSlide 6B: best response toEquilibriumFree riding by APareto efficient outcomeUnderprovision of publicImplementation of efficient outcomeL23Public GoodsPublic Goods -- DefinitionSome goods are:–Nonexcludable (NE): all consumers can consume the good.–Nonrival (NR): each consumer can consume all of the good.A good is purely public if NE and NRE NERNRExamples of public goodsNational defenseMathematical formula (Research)Nice melodyBroadcast radio and TV programsReduction in air pollutionNational parksPark Size: Market OutcomeTwo agents: A and BTwo goods: Park and BurgersPark is a public good A: Burger loverB: Park lover1x2x1 1 1A Bx x x 1 2 2 1 1( , ) 2ln( )A A A A BU x x x x x  1 2 2 1 1( , ) 4ln( )B B B A BU x x x x x  A: best response to 10 ,1$21 mpp2 1 1() 2ln( )A A A BU x x x  11Bx A: best response to 10 ,1$21 mpp2 1 1() 2ln( )A A A BU x x x  1BxB: best response to 1 2$1, 10Bp p m  2 1 1() 4ln( )B B A BU x x x  1AxEquilibriumNash Equilibrium:- best response to- best response to* *1 1,A Bx x*1Ax*1Bx*1Ax*1BxFree riding by AIn Nash Equilibrium:B: Creates a park of size 4A: Does not contribute at all and uses the park created by BFree riding by ASize of the park (General rule) * *1 1, (0, 4)A Bx x Pareto efficient outcomeMayor maximizes welfare of both A and BA BU U U Underprovision of publicEfficient size of Park: 6Underprovision of public good Public good: positive externality(Pareto) optimal size (General Rule)Implementation of efficient outcomeHow to implement efficient outcome?Tax agents and provide Public GoodProblem: Information about valuationMechanism design: How to extract information in the least costly


View Full Document

UW-Madison ECON 301 - Public Goods

Download Public Goods
Our administrator received your request to download this document. We will send you the file to your email shortly.
Loading Unlocking...
Login

Join to view Public Goods and access 3M+ class-specific study document.

or
We will never post anything without your permission.
Don't have an account?
Sign Up

Join to view Public Goods 2 2 and access 3M+ class-specific study document.

or

By creating an account you agree to our Privacy Policy and Terms Of Use

Already a member?