DOC PREVIEW
GSU POLS 2401 - Hotspots: Iran and Preventing Nuclear Poliferation
Type Lecture Note
Pages 3

This preview shows page 1 out of 3 pages.

Save
View full document
View full document
Premium Document
Do you want full access? Go Premium and unlock all 3 pages.
Access to all documents
Download any document
Ad free experience
Premium Document
Do you want full access? Go Premium and unlock all 3 pages.
Access to all documents
Download any document
Ad free experience

Unformatted text preview:

POLS 2401 1st EditionOutline of Previous LectureGenocide and InterventionI. 20 th Century Genocide and Crimes against HumanityII. GenocideA.HolocaustB. WWIIC. Raphael LemkinIII. Genocide ConventionA. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of GenocideB. Preventing GenocideC. Punishing Genocide: TribunalsOutline of Current LectureHotspots: Iran and Preventing Nuclear ProliferationI. Nuclear WeaponsA. Approaches to Dealing with the problem of Nuclear Arms ProliferationB. CasesII. High risks of nuclear proliferationA. Gamble of proliferation too high: it can reduce chances of war, but not eliminate themB. Difficult to reproduce MAD if countries small and poor, weakening the deterrence valueC. Terrorists, black marketIII. Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT)IV. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)V. Iran: Historical and Geopolitical ContextVI. Iran’s Nuclear ProgramNuclear Weapons -Approaches to Dealing with the problem of Nuclear Arms Proliferation-Arms reduction (US, USSR/Russia)-Prevent spread of nuclear arms to other states: nonproliferation and the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT)-Cases-Iran-North Korea (next class)-High risks of nuclear proliferation-Gamble of proliferation too high: it can reduce chances of war, but not eliminate them-Difficult to reproduce MAD if countries small and poor, weakening the deterrence value-Pre-emptive strike-Launch on warning-Terrorists, black markets-Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT)-First signed in 1968, 189 nations are now party-All nations agree not to provide technological or material assistance that would allow other nations to build up nuclear weapons-Non-nuclear states agree to forgo nuclear weapons-5 recognized nuclear powers (US, USSR, France, UK, China) agree to help other countries develop civilian nuclear power plants and take steps towards disarming-No requirement or timetable for -nuclear powers to disarm-International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)-Set up in 1957 as an independent UN body charged with promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy-IAEA is responsible for monitoring compliance with the NPT-IAEA can conduct inspections for evidence of nuclear weapons programs in non-nuclear states-Limits to IAEA and NPT-IAEA has no powers to enforce the NPT and must approach the UN Security Council to impose sanctions if violations are uncovered-Parties to the NPT may withdraw with 3 months notice “if it decides that extraordinary events…have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.”-No control over nuclear states that not party to the NPTIran: Historical and Geopolitical Context-US-Iran Relations and Background of Iran’s Anti-West Stance-Pre 1979: US support of the Shah and his regime-Breakdown in the US-Iran relationship: overthrow of the Shah in 1979 by a fundamentalist Islamic revolution, unfriendly to the US (kidnapping crisis) and essentially Anti--West-Israel and Iran: -Tense relationship, especially since 1979 -support of anti-Israel terrorist groups-Iran’s regional ambitions-Iran’s Nuclear Program-Early Nuclear Programs under the Shah-Rising Iranian interest in a Nuclear Program in the 1990s-1995: rebuilding of the Bushehr nuclear plant starts (originally started under Shah)-Other nuclear facilities (e.g. Arak, Natanz, Esfahan, etc)-Nuclear Program: Officially it is just for power-Concerns about the Program-Uranium enrichment: could be used for a nuclear weapon-Recent testing that could be used for weapons-International Efforts to Stop Iran’s Nuclear Program-IAEA-Conducts inspections of the plants-Issued reports saying Iran did not declare its uranium enrichment program (2003), and reports in 2010 and 2011 indicating that Iran is conductingtesting for nuclear weapons -UN Resolutions (2006-2011): stop enrichment programs, economic and military sanctions-United States and EU-3 (UK, France, Germany)-Diplomatic efforts and harsh economic sanctions -P5 (US, Russia, China, UK, France) +1 (Germany) Negotiations: Diplomatic efforts-November 2013 and January 2014 breakthrough: joint plan of action and interim agreement (6 months) – a “pause” period within which to work for a longer lasting


View Full Document

GSU POLS 2401 - Hotspots: Iran and Preventing Nuclear Poliferation

Type: Lecture Note
Pages: 3
Download Hotspots: Iran and Preventing Nuclear Poliferation
Our administrator received your request to download this document. We will send you the file to your email shortly.
Loading Unlocking...
Login

Join to view Hotspots: Iran and Preventing Nuclear Poliferation and access 3M+ class-specific study document.

or
We will never post anything without your permission.
Don't have an account?
Sign Up

Join to view Hotspots: Iran and Preventing Nuclear Poliferation 2 2 and access 3M+ class-specific study document.

or

By creating an account you agree to our Privacy Policy and Terms Of Use

Already a member?