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UW-Madison ECON 522 - ECON 522 Lecture 6

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Econ 522 Economics of LawLogisticsOur story so far on property law…Slide 4One application of this: choosing a remedy for property rights violationsCalabresi and MelamedHow do we design an efficient property law system?Public versus Private GoodsSlide 9Slide 10Slide 11Slide 12A different view: transaction costsSlide 13What can an owner do with his property?So, what does an efficient property law system look like?Slide 16Experiment: Coasian bargainingSlide 19Why did we do this?Slide 20Dynamic games and sequential rationalityDynamic gamesWe can put payoffs from this game into a payoff matrix…Slide 25The key assumption behind subgame perfect equilibrium: common knowledge of rationalitySlide 26Intellectual PropertyInformation: costly to generate, easy to imitateInformation: costly to generate, easy to imitatePatents: one way to solve the problemBUT… patents solve one inefficiency by introducing anotherEcon 522Economics of LawDan QuintSpring 2011Lecture 62HW2 (Property Law) online, due 5 p.m. Thurs Feb 24Midterms will be Wed March 2 and Wed March 30Logistics3Coase: in the absence of transaction costs, if property rights are complete and tradable, voluntary negotiations will lead to efficiencyWe can solve externalities by expanding property rights and allowing tradeDemsetz: property rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains from internalization become larger than the cost of internalizationFur trade increased overhunting and therefore value of private property rightsDomestication of the dog decreased the cost of maintaining private propertyOur story so far on property law…4Two normative approaches to the law:Normative Coase: aim to minimize transaction costsNormative Hobbes: aim to allocate rights efficiently (or minimize the need for bargaining/trade)How to choose between two normative approaches?When transaction costs are low and information costs high, design law to minimize transaction costsWhat transaction costs are high and information costs are low, design law to allocate rights efficientlyOur story so far on property law…5Injunctive relief: court clarifies right, bars future violation (punishable as a crime)Damages: court determines how much harm was done by violation, awards payment to injureeCoase: should be equally efficient if there are no transaction costsBut in “real world”, which is more efficient?One application of this: choosing a remedy for property rights violations6Calabresi and MelamedTransaction costs high…difficult for parties to reassign rights through negotiationsinjunction would force injurer to prevent harm himselfdamages rule allows injurer to prevent harm or pay for it, whichever is cheaperwhen transaction costs are high, damages rule is typically more efficient“liability rule”Transaction costs low…easy for parties to reassign rightsinjunctions cheaper for court to implement (doesn’t need to calculate damage done)when transaction costs are low, injunctive relief is typically more efficient“property rule”7what can be privately owned?what can an owner do?how are property rights established?what remedies are given?How do we design an efficient property law system?8Public versus Private GoodsPrivate Goodsrivalrous – one’s consumption precludes anotherexcludable – technologically possible to prevent consumptionexample: applePublic Goodsnon-rivalrousnon-excludableexamples: defense against nuclear attackinfrastructure (roads, bridges)parks, clean air, large fireworks displays9When private goods are owned publicly, they tend to be overutilized/overexploitedPublic versus Private Goods10When private goods are owned publicly, they tend to be overutilized/overexploitedWhen public goods are privately owned, they tend to be underprovided/undersuppliedPublic versus Private Goods11When private goods are owned publicly, they tend to be overutilized/overexploitedWhen public goods are privately owned, they tend to be underprovided/undersuppliedEfficiency suggests private goods should be privately owned, and public goods should be publicly provided/regulatedPublic versus Private Goods12When private goods are owned publicly, they tend to be overutilized/overexploitedWhen public goods are privately owned, they tend to be underprovided/undersuppliedEfficiency suggests private goods should be privately owned, and public goods should be publicly provided/regulatedPublic versus Private Goods13Clean airLarge number of people affected  transaction costs high injunctive relief unlikely to work wellStill two optionsOne: give property owners right to clean air, protected by damagesTwo: public regulationArgue for one or the other by comparing costs of eachDamages: costs are legal cost of lawsuits or pretrial negotiationsRegulation: administrative costs, error costs if level is not chosen correctlyA different view: transaction costs14what can be privately owned?what can an owner do?how are property rights established?what remedies are given?15Principle of maximum libertyOwners can do whatever they like with their property, provided it does not interfere with other’ property or rightsThat is, you can do anything you like so long as it doesn’t impose an externality (nuisance) on anyone elseWhat can an owner do with his property?16What things can be privately owned?Private goods are privately owned, public goods are publicly providedWhat can owners do with their property?Maximum libertyHow are property rights established?(Examples to come)What remedies are given?Injunctions when transaction costs are low; damages when transaction costs are highSo, what does an efficient property law system look like?17Up next: applicationsBut first: an experiment18Each person given a personal value for a poker chipAmount you can sell it back to me for (real money)Purple chip is worth your number, red chip is worth 2 x your numberEach person can only sell back one chipTake 1: buyer’s and seller’s values are common knowledge (nametags)Take 2: private information(each player knows his threat point, but not his opponent’s)Experiment: Coasian bargaining19Take 3: uncertaintyIf seller keeps chip, it’s worth 2 x die roll ($2-$12, EV $7)If buyer gets chip, it’s worth 3 x die roll ($3-$18, EV $10.50)Can’t sell for conditional price


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UW-Madison ECON 522 - ECON 522 Lecture 6

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