1 17 42 MIT poli sci dept Stephen Van Evera WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND WORLD POLITICS I WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION WHAT THEY ARE Three types of weapons are grouped together perhaps unwisely under the rubric of Weapons of Mass Destruction WMD Of these nuclear and biological weapons are potentially far more powerful than chemical weapons Biological and chemical weapons have been outlawed by international convention The United States dropped its offensive bioweapons program in 1969 Key background questions A Would the world be better off if nuclear weapons had never been invented Would it be better off if nuclear weapons were now abolished B Would the world be better off if biological weapons had never been invented Would it be better off if biological weapons were now abolished C If nuclear and biological weapons cannot be abolished or controlled what should we now do II THE TECHNICAL EFFECTS OF THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION Technologies rarely have decisive effects on war or politics more often technology is bent to serve politics or military doctrine Nuclear weapons are an exception They overwhelm politics and doctrine Five cascading technical effects flow from the nuclear revolution These cascade further into political effects listed below in Section V The technical effects are A Effect 1 hydrogen bombs offer an increase of six orders of magnitude over the power of the TNT explosives used in World War II The atomic bomb x 1 000 increase on TNT the hydrogen bomb x 1 000 increase on atomic bombs B Effect 2 due to A the destructiveness of nuclear weapons the cost exchange ratio vastly favors retaliators over attackers who try to disarm them Nuclear weapons pack tremendous explosive power in devices that are cheap light easily hidden protected and delivered Hence destroying nuclear weapons is very hard protecting and delivering them very easy C Effect 3 due to B the cost exchange ratio a relationship of MAD Mutual Assured Destruction develops between major powers Both can destroy the other s society even after absorbing an all out counterforce attack by the other In short both have a second strike countervalue capability In the Cold War both the US and USSR sought to avert MAD preferring instead to deny the other a second strike countervalue capability but they could not escape it Technology overrode their desires D Effect 4 flat of the curve dynamics One of MAD s special characteristics is the flat of the curve beyond a certain point the capacity to inflict damage on the other society or to prevent damage to one s own is inelastic to the size and capability of one s own force or one s opponent s force Capabilities are absolute Implication MAD prevents preventive war E Effect 5 the multiplier effect The efficiency with which one side must strike the other s forces in order to leave the other unable to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation increases sharply as the arsenals on both sides grow Even an inefficient strike can reduce the retaliation to acceptable levels if both arsenals are very small even a very efficient strike e g 99 percent effective can fail to reduce retaliation to acceptable levels if both arsenals are very large Hence first strikes are least thinkable when arsenals are large suggesting the argument that the more weapons both sides have the less the risk of their use Implication the India Pakistan nuclear competition is more dangerous than was the U S Soviet competition 2 III ALTERNATE NUCLEAR DOCTRINES COUNTERVALUE vs COUNTERFORCE STRATEGIES A Countervalue vs Counterforce Nuclear Strategies Nuclear weapons present states with two basic nuclear doctrines counterforce and countervalue Countervalue the enemy society is targeted Political aims are achieved by threatening to punish the adversary by destroying its population and industry Counterforce the enemy nuclear forces are targeted Political aims are achieved by threatening to disarm the adversary that is to remove its capacity to inflict punishment on oneself Since forces can be used first or second we have a crude universe of four possible nuclear capabilities 1 First strike countervalue capability the capacity to launch a first strike that inflicts unacceptable damage on the adversary s society This capability is very easy to build for reasons noted above in Section I but is quite useless 2 Second strike countervalue capability the capacity to absorb an all out counterforce first strike and inflict unacceptable damage on the adversary s society in retaliation This capability is easy to build for reasons noted above in Section I 3 First strike counterforce the capacity to launch a first strike that removes the adversary s capacity to inflict unacceptable damage on oneself in retaliation This capability is very hard or impossible to build for reasons noted above in Section I 4 Second strike counterforce capability the capacity to absorb an all out counterforce first strike and mount a counterforce counterattack that leaves the attacker s forces unable to inflict unacceptable further damage on one s own society This capability is even harder to build than a first strike counterforce capability These four capabilities can be displayed in a 2x2 table Striking what Values cities Forces 0 1 First 3 First Strike Strike First Countervalue Counterforce Striking Capability Capability When 3 1 2 Second 4 Second Second Strike Strike Countervalue Counterforce Capability Capability 2 Cold War ear debates over US nuclear doctrine focused on whether the US should be content with capability 2 second strike countervalue capability or should also strive for 3 first strike counterforce capability against the USSR More recently some analysts suggest that the U S should deny even capability 1 first strike countervalue capability to states like North Korea and Iran B Countervalue vs Counterforce Strategic Nuclear Weapons What Are they Second strike countervalue nuclear forces can survive a surprise attack and retaliate against the attacker s cities or other value targets An example of a pure second strike countervalue weapon is the U S Polaris ballistic missile submarine fleet of the 1960 1980s era Polaris submarines could hide from attack in the vast ocean and their missiles could strike an attacker s cities but these missiles lacked the accuracy to destroy another state s hardened forces First strike counterforce nuclear forces can be used to destroy an opponent s nuclear forces in a first strike 3 An example of a pure first