A Shuddering Dawn Religious Studies and the Nuclear Age Edited by Ira Chernus and Edward Tabor LinenthalWith a Foreword by Ninian Smart State University of New York PressIRA CHERNUS Chapter 3 Nuclear Images in the Popular Press: From Apocalypse to Static Balance Nuclear imagery had lain dormant for some fifteen years when it emerged again in the late 1970s. By 1982, it had reached a crescendo of concern rivaling that of 1962. Although much had changed over two decades, much remained the same. Reader's Digest was still by far the most widely read magazine in the country. Time-Life, Inc., was still the leader in the news category, although Time had replaced Life in the number one slot. And the arms race spiraled on, unabated. While the nation seemed to rest from nuclear anxiety and "the nightmare of actual war receded somewhat into the subconscious of civilization ... in the '60s and '70s, both sides increased their nuclear firepower by several orders of magnitude."1 There was one momentous new reality, however: by the beginning of the 1980s, the United States could no longer claim nuclear superiority. Indeed, Reader's Digest warned that "the United States is already running second in important aspects of military prepared ness,"2 and Time concluded that "the two nations are in rough paritymeaning essentially that each could destroy the other."3 Whether our position was perceived as parity or inferiority, a major shift in nuclear imagery was inescapable. With military victory no longer a meaningful concept, images of omnipotence and readiness for apocalyptic war could not be sustained. Some new context was needed to give meaning to the Bomb and the arms race. The media apparently realized this before the Reagan administration. Although the Reaganites spoke freely and easily about fighting a nuclear war, Time assured its readers that 3334 As for the USSR, "the preponderance of the evidence is that the Soviets just do not want to fight a war."5 The premise of nuclear imagery in the 1980s was that no one intends to use these weapons to fight a global war: "Nuclear war remains a special kind of nightmare, threatening an apocalypse for the whole human race.'6 "The only thing harder to imagine than a permanent reconciliation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. is a rationalization on the part of either nation for taking the risk of all-out war."7 Visions of apocalyptic battle had to recede into the background, but the Bornb remained front and center in the nation's consciousness in the only meaningful role left to it-guarantor of safety and peace. How could the Bomb keep the peace? The new image turned out to be a very old one, refurbished for the nuclear age: "While balance of power may be an old fashioned idea, it can be argued to be all the more valid now that power is nuclear. Precisely because these arsenals must not be used, they must keep each other in check."8 The image of stable balance-rationally achieved and rationally maintained-became the unifying thread tying together all the nuclear imagery of the 1980s. The central message was that nuclear weapons can still be our savior, because they play a crucial role in moving the world toward perfect and immutable balance. Despite this new vision, the Cold War still rages on in all its cosmic importance and intensity. "The Russians say plainly, over and over again, that they are in an ideological war with us.... Most Americans believe that the war of ideologies will determine the future of the world order."9 The NATO military commander contrasted himself with his Russian counterpart: "I'm defending liberty and all the values we hold so dear in the West. He's fighting for secret police, censorship, labor camps and the suppression of individual freedom."'° In sum, "the values of the U.S. and Soviet society are too starkly contrasting to permit for the foreseeable future anything friendlier than a more cautious competition. "11 The competition must be more cautious because the stakes are so much higher; balance must be maintained at all costs. And this is now seen as the overriding threat and crime of the Soviet Union-its irresponsible and unpredictable destabilizing behavior. "Nothing did more to destroy detente than the Kremlin's insistence throughout the Ira Chernus even those in the Administration who sincerely believe that the U.S., if it had to, could fight and win a nuclear war agree that the primary goal of U.S. weapons and policy should be preventing one.... The best way to prevent a holocaust is to prevent any kind of nuclear war in the first place. On that everyone agrees .4 From Apocalypse to Static Balance 35 race "would raise the danger of a political crisis turning into a military one, inadvertently but catastrophically. "13 "They might be tempted to try to get the drop on the U.S. in a High-Noon-type showdown over some crisis in the Third World or Europe." 14 The confrontation "would probably be related to political instability in some region or the competition for scarce resources, or both."15 If "the nuclear arms race has reached a point that no one could really have wanted,"and the United States must prepare for a war it does not want to fight, "the fault for these deepening dilemmas lies largely with the Soviet Union. If the Soviets were truly interested in restoring stable mutual deterrence, they could scale down their military machine and desist from international behavior that provokes crises. They could also negotiate arms reductions in good faith. Although Soviet leaders loudly proclaim their desire for peace, they are simply "trying to enhance their bogus claim of championing disarmament. "17 When both sides do sit down at the bargaining table, "The United States tends to enter negotiations in a spirit of good will and fair play. This is hardly the Soviet approach.... We failed in the SALT negotiations because we continued to believe that the Russians would or could think like us."" Indeed, the contrast in thinking could hardly be more complete. Whereas they talk of peace without meaning it, we talk of war without meaning it. As is often the case in the realm of the sacred, there is a deeper truth hidden beneath superficial appearances. If the president lets slip some "loose talk" about limited nuclear war, this is just a "tiny tempest" that should "stay in the teapot." 19 "Reagan, according to his closest aides, believes fervently in reducing nuclear arms.",' If he enthusiastically builds up our nuclear