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MIT 16 885J - Study Notes

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DR. ROBERT H. GODDARD HISTORICAL ESSAY ASSURRED ACCESS: “THE BUREAUCRATIC SPACE WAR" E. C. Pete Aldridge, Jr.The Policy Mistake The United States made a tragic policy decision in the late 1970’s when President Jimmy Carter decided that the Space Shuttle would be the exclusive means for the United States to launch satellites into space.1 This decision was based on highly optimistic data on the cost effectiveness of the Shuttle over the unmanned expendable launch vehicles (ELV) being used at the time. The information presented to the President was that: --the Shuttle would cost about one-third the cost of the expendable launch vehicles with comparable payload capacity; --the Shuttle could be ready for a reflight only after seven days of maintenance and check-out, resulting in a flight rate of about 55 launches per year for the entire Shuttle fleet; and --all five Shuttles to be built would be identical and would have performance capability sufficient to fly the largest US payloads. There were, however, those in the Department of Defense (DOD) who were skeptical about these performance estimates and who were worried about the “Shuttle only” space launch policy. They were overruled by those in the Pentagon in leadership positions who were convinced that the only way that Congress would approve the development of the Shuttle would be to tie the Shuttle to the imperatives of launching payloads essential to the security of the United States. In addition, even the skeptics thought that if only the flight cost estimates came true, the cost savings could be put back into the military space program in the form of improved satellites, on-orbit satellite spares and enhanced reliability and on-orbit lifetime. Their fears about having only a single launch vehicle would be offset by having a more redundant and capable satellite system for a variety of military missions 1 Presidential Directive No 37, May 11, 1978. 1The first Shuttle, Columbia, was planned to be launched from Kennedy Spaceflight Center (KSC) in 1979. To hedge against the uncertainties of Shuttle performance or reliability, the plan was to maintain the production of expendable launch vehicles to back up the Shuttle for two years after the first launch from KSC. In the meantime, satellites were being redesigned to take advantage of the larger cargo volume and weight that the Shuttle offered. In addition, since the price charged by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to launch satellites was based on the length of the cargo bay they occupied, satellites tended to become wider and shorter, filling the 15 foot width of the Shuttle bay. This also had a profound and direct impact on the future of the launch vehicle business---satellites were becoming larger and heavier than the current class of ELVs could lift. Congress making sure DOD had no way out, stated that they would not approve of any future DOD satellite unless it was designed exclusively to fly in the Shuttle.2 The Shuttle Flies--And America Cheers Columbia’s first flight did not occur until April 1981, three months into the Reagan Administration. The flight was a remarkable national and international success. In spite of the delay, all Americans, and indeed people all over the world, felt pride in America and her technological achievement. The intensity of this pride was particularity great since the US was just beginning to exit a period of the late 1970’s that was embarrassing to the status, power and prestige of the country. The Shuttle was supposedly declared “operational” by the fourth flight in July 1982. President Reagan attended the Ianding at Edwards Air Force Base, California, on July 4, 1982 and announced his first National Space Policy.3 In that policy he noted that the “Space Transportation System” would be the primary US national launch system and he called for expansion of the private sector involvement and investment in civil space and related activities. In reality, major support problems plagued the Shuttle program. These problems were primarily the lack of spare parts and technical problems which caused long reflight preparation times. The real costs to launch the Shuttle were becoming apparent and low launch 2Personal knowledge of the author, based on conversations with Congressional staff. 3NationaI Space Policy, July 4, 1982. 2rates forced these large overhead costs to be spread over fewer flights. While the original plan called for each of five orbiters to be essentially identical, in reality each of the orbiters were different and the performance of each was substantially below the design specifications. NASA had promised that each orbiter would 65,000 pounds of payload to low earth orbit from Kennedy Center and 32,000 pounds to a polar orbit4 from Vandenberg AFB, California. The final Shuttle capabilities were nearly 20% short of these goals. Since DOD had committed satellite designs to take advantage of the promised weight and volume capabilities of the Shuttle, two upgrade programs had to be developed by NASA--a filament wound case for the Shuttle solid rocket motors and an improvement to the Shuttle main engines permitting them to perform at a higher thrust. Both of these performance upgrades would be demonstrated with the first flight from Vandenberg AFB, with Discovery, planned for July 1986. Even though the cost, performance and flight rate problems with the Shuttle were of concern to DOD, there was still some optimism that they would be overcome. In March 1983, in testimony before the House Subcommittee on Space Science and Application, the Air Force, the executive agent for DOD’s Shuttle launch operations continued to express optimism about the Shuttle.5 Indeed, it would be very difficult at this point to show any concern over a program that was receiving so much praise and admiration from Americans and the world public. However, the Air Force, somewhat meekly, outlined a “Back-up Strategy” for the Shuttle. If the sixth Shuttle flight was successful, the Air Force would not proceed with the procurement of the 17th and 18th Titan 34D currently in the budget and would terminate the existing Titan production line--the


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MIT 16 885J - Study Notes

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