124.231 Ethics – Handout 17 Nagel, “Ethics” (or “Autonomy and Deontology”) The “central problem of ethics”: “how the lives, interests, and welfare of others make claims on us and how these claims, of various forms, are to be reconciled with the aim of living our own lives” (p. 164) Agent-relative vs. Agent-Neutral Reasons “If a reason can be given a general form which does not include an essential reference to the person who has it, it is an agent-neutral reason. For example, if it is a reason for anyone to do or want something that it would reduce the amount of wretchedness in the world, then that is a neutral reason. If on the other hand the general form of a reason does include an essential reference to the person who has it, it is an agent-relative reason. For example, if it is a reason for anyone to do or want something that it would be in his interest, then that is a relative reason.” (pp. 152-3) On the relevance of agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons: “Ethics is concerned not only with what should happen, but also independently with what people should or may do. Neutral reasons underlie the former; but relative reasons can affect the latter.” (p. 165) Three kinds of agent-relative reasons: • Reasons of autonomy: these are reasons we have because of our (optional) interests and projects – interests and projects whose value to us may be recognizable from the objective perspective, but which don’t thereby have value for anyone. Reasons of autonomy limit what we are required to do in the service of impersonal value. • Deontological reasons: these are reasons not to maltreat others in certain ways, which are not just reasons to bring it about that no one is maltreated. Deontological reasons limit what we are permitted to do in the service of impersonal value. • Reasons of obligation: these are reasons that stem from the special obligations we have towards those to whom we are closely related; whether these reasons set limits on what we are required or permitted to do is less straightforward (are we permitted or required to give preference to our children’s well-being?). Nagel says he’s less confident that these reasons can’t be accommodated by a purely agent-neutral conception of value. Reasons of autonomy Nagel suggests the markers of agent-relative reasons of autonomy are: • They are generated by things we value by choice • They are (generally?) not generated by universally-shared values 2• They are not “close to home” – they aren’t generated by experiential or subjective states, or attached to things that “determine the character of life from the inside” Paradigm cases of values (and disvalues) that generate agent-neutral reasons: pleasure and pain; but also very general human goods whose value to us is evident before we consider our particular or optional preferences and projects: freedom, self-respect, access to opportunities and resources. Paradigm cases of values that generate agent-relative reasons: the value of the end-goals of our adopted preferences and projects – e.g., climbing Mt. Kilimajaro, building a monument to our God, learning to play all of Beethoven’s piano sonatas. These things, Nagel claims, are things we can recognize others as having a reason to pursue – we can recognize as valuable to them – without thereby concluding that they are valuable from the objective standpoint, or give us reasons. Questions: • What about the more general value of getting to do what you want? That seems plausibly something that is universally valued, and not exactly by choice. If climbing Mt. ilimanjaro helps you achieve something you want, does that give me agent-neutral easons to help you do it? Kr‐ Nagel thinks not; this has something to do with his third marker for agent-relative values – he thinks neutral value at most attaches to the pleasure you get from success, or the frustration you’d get from not getting what you want. But the actual achievement (as opposed to the mere experience – which, after all, is not what you want) can’t get agent-neutral value just from your wanting it. But this seems to require an independent argument against the value of preference-satisfaction per se. And I’m not sure Nagel supplies it. • Nagel’s distinction allows us to defend a kind of protection from the impingement of the projects and goals of others on our own lives: I’m not always required to sacrifice my own goals for those of others, just because those goals matter more in some sense to others than mine matter to me. But how exactly are my agent-neutral and agent-relative easons associated with my good to be balanced against the agent-neutral reasons enerated by someone else’s good? rg‐ One possibility is that when deciding what to do, I simply sum the a-n and a-r reasons provided by my needs and the a-n reasons provided by the needs of others; but this may not reflect the requirement to way my preferences differently when they compete with my a-n needs than when the compete with yours: it’s reasonable for me to endure pain and hunger for the sake of climbing Mt. K, but perhaps not for me to let you endure pain and hunger so that I can climb Mt. K. • hy is acting on agent-relative reasons of autonomy optional? W‐ Is it because we can voluntarily abandon the relevant projects for the sake of other people’s good? This thought may help us draw the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative values… The former, but not the latter, can be “given up” 3 Deontological Reasons Characteristics of such reasons: • They are personal demands governing our relations with others • Exemplified by such deontological requirements as not lying or breaking promises or killing or violating people’s rights, and not treating others as mere means to the promotion of the greater good (car accident example) • Cannot be understood in terms of the agent-neutral badness of such acts: they are particularly reasons against your doing something (e.g., I have strong reasons not to twist the kid’s are in Nagel’s example, although doing so may help me get my friends to the but if I were given the option of getting my friends to the hospital or preventing an arm-twisting, it would be completely clear that I ought to help my friends) • Strange sort of reason: cannot have its source in the value to others of not