Page 1Case NumberDepartment LetterCountyJudge's Last NamePage 2Page 3Page 4Page 5Page 6Page 7Page 8Page 9Page 10Page 11Page 12Page 1347 U.S.C. § 230 (1996).1IN THE COURT OF APPEALSSTATE OF ARIZONADIVISION ONEMARK ANDREW AUSTIN,Plaintiff-Appellant,v.CRYSTALTECH WEB HOSTING, an Arizonacorporation; JOHN M. DANIELS aka JACKDANIELS, d/b/a, PT BALI DISCOVERYTOURS,Defendants-Appellees. )))))))))))))1 CA-CV 04-0823DEPARTMENT CO P I N I O N Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa CountyCause No. CV2004-000253The Honorable Cathy M. Holt, JudgeAFFIRMEDBritt & Bluff, P.C. PhoenixBy Edward H. BrittKathryn A. BattockAttorneys for Plaintiff-AppellantHopkins & Kreamer L.L.P. PhoenixBy Stephen M. HopkinsGregorio M. GarciaAttorneys for Defendants-AppelleesP O R T L E Y, Judge¶1 We are asked to determine whether section 509 of theCommunications Decency Act of 1996 (the “CDA”) bars a defamation1The CDA defines an “interactive computer service” as “any2information service, system, or access software provider thatprovides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computerserver, including specifically a service or system that providesaccess to the Internet and such systems operated or servicesoffered by libraries or educational institutions.” 47 U.S.C.§ 230(f)(2). There is no dispute that CrystalTech falls withinthis definition.2claim and related state tort claims against an interactive computerservices provider. We also examine whether the court had personal2jurisdiction over John M. Daniels (“Daniels”), a resident of Bali,Indonesia. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the superiorcourt’s rulings.BACKGROUND¶2 Mark A. Austin (“Austin”) and Daniels operate separatetravel-related businesses in Bali. CrystalTech Web Hosting(“CrystalTech”), an Arizona corporation, operates an internetwebsite hosting company in Maricopa County, and provides websiteservices for Daniels’ business, Bali Discovery Tours.¶3 Austin sued Daniels after an article appeared on the BaliDiscovery Tours’ website alleging that Bali officials were going tofile criminal charges against Austin. He sued CrystalTech becauseit refused to remove the allegedly defamatory statements from theBali Discovery Tours website. ¶4 CrystalTech moved for summary judgment, and argued thatthe CDA granted it immunity from Austin’s state court claims.Daniels then moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personalAlthough the motion’s caption indicated both CrystalTech and3Daniels sought dismissal, the motion only addressed the claimsagainst Daniels. The superior court did not address Daniels’ argument4regarding lack of personal service. 3service and lack of personal jurisdiction. The superior court3granted CrystalTech’s motion, and dismissed the claims againstDaniels because he did not have sufficient minimum contacts withArizona to establish personal jurisdiction.4¶5 Austin appealed the signed minute entry order. We havejurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”)section 12-2101(B) (2003).DISCUSSIONI. Communications Decency Act¶6 Austin challenges the superior court’s determination thatCrystalTech was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.We review the ruling de novo. Ariz. Joint Venture v. Ariz. Dep’t.of Revenue, 205 Ariz. 50, 53, ¶ 14, 66 P.3d 771, 774 (App. 2002).¶7 CrystalTech contends that the CDA grants it immunity fromstate tort claims. Austin challenges that interpretation, andargues that because the federal statute only applies to claimsagainst the primary publisher of defamatory material, CrystalTechis still liable as a distributor of defamatory material. ¶8 At common law, those who publicize another’s libel may betreated: (1) as primary publishers (such as book or newspaper4publishers); (2) as conduits (such as a telephone company); or (3)as distributors (such as a book store, library, or news dealer).Primary publishers are generally held to a standard of liabilitycomparable to that of authors because they actively cooperate inpublication. See Prosser & Keeton on Torts 810 (W. Page Keeton,ed., West Group 5th ed. 1984); see also Restatement (Second) ofTorts (“Restatement”) § 581(1) cmt. c (1977). Conduits lack theability to screen and control the information being communicatedand are therefore ordinarily immune from liability. See Lunney v.Prodigy Services Co., 723 N.E.2d 539, 542 (N.Y. 1999); see alsoRestatement § 581(1) cmt. f. Distributors are, however, subject toan intermediate standard of responsibility, and may be held liableas publishers if they know or have reason to know of the defamatorynature of the matter they disseminate. See Restatement § 581(1)cmts. d, e.¶9 The internet, however, has challenged the conventionalanalysis, and courts have attempted to apply common law principlesto the new medium. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Liability ofInternet Service Provider for Internet or E-Mail Defamation, 84A.L.R. 5th 169 (2000). Congress intervened and enacted Title V ofthe Telecommunications Act of 1996, the CDA. Although its “primarygoal . . . was to control the exposure of minors to indecentmaterial,” Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003),Congress wanted to “remove disincentives for the development and5utilization of blocking and filtering technologies” and toencourage the development of technologies that allow users tocontrol the information they receive. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (b)(3)-(4).To effectuate its goals, Congress chose to “override[] thetraditional treatment of publishers, distributors, and speakersunder statutory and common law.” Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1026. ¶10 Section 230(c) of the CDA provides:(1) Treatment of publisher or speakerNo provider or user of an interactive computerservice shall be treated as the publisher orspeaker of any information provided by anotherinformation content provider.(2) Civil liability No provider or user of an interactive computerservice shall be held liable on account of - (A) any action voluntarily taken in good faithto restrict access to or availability ofmaterial that the provider or user considersto be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,excessively violent, harassing, or otherwiseobjectionable, whether or not such material isconstitutionally protected; or(B) any action taken to enable or makeavailable to information content providers orothers the technical means to restrict accessto material described in [subparagraph (A)].47 U.S.C. §
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