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U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task ForceFinal Report on theAugust 14, 2003 Blackoutin theUnited States and Canada:Causes andRecommendationsApril 2004U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task ForceFinal Report on theAugust 14, 2003 Blackoutin theUnited States and Canada:Causes andRecommendationsApril 2004ii G U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force G August 14th Blackout: Causes and Recommendations GU.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force March 31, 2004 Dear Mr. President and Prime Minister: We are pleased to submit the Final Report of the U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force. As directed by you, the Task Force has completed a thorough investigation of the causes of the August 14, 2003 blackout and has recommended actions to minimize the likelihood and scope of similar events in the future. The report makes clear that this blackout could have been prevented and that immediate actions must be taken in both the United States and Canada to ensure that our electric system is more reliable. First and foremost, compliance with reliability rules must be made mandatory with substantial penalties for non-compliance. We expect continued collaboration between our two countries to implement this report’s recommendations. Failure to implement the recommendations would threaten the reliability of the electricity supply that is critical to the economic, energy and national security of our countries. The work of the Task Force has been an outstanding example of close and effective cooperation between the U.S. and Canadian governments. Such work will continue as we strive to implement the Final Report’s recommendations. We resolve to work in cooperation with Congress, Parliament, states, provinces and stakeholders to ensure that North America’s electric grid is robust and reliable. We would like to specifically thank the members of the Task Force and its Working Groups for their efforts and support as we investigated the blackout and moved toward completion of the Final Report. All involved have made valuable contributions. We submit this report with optimism that its recommendations will result in better electric service for the people of both our nations. Sincerely, U.S. Secretary of Energy Minister of Natural Resources CanadaContentsPageG U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force G August 14th Blackout: Causes and Recommendations G iii1. Introduction ..................................................................... 12. Overview of the North American Electric Power System and Its Reliability Organizations ....... 5The North American Power Grid Is One Large, Interconnected Machine .................... 5Planning and Reliable Operation of the Power Grid Are Technically Demanding.............. 6Reliability Organizations Oversee Grid Reliability in North America ....................... 10Key Parties in the Pre-Cascade Phase of the August 14 Blackout ........................... 123. Causes of the Blackout and Violations of NERC Standards................................. 17Summary...................................................................... 17The Causes of the Blackout in Ohio ................................................. 17Linking Causes to Specific Weaknesses .............................................. 17Institutional Issues .............................................................. 214. Context and Preconditions for the Blackout: The Northeastern Power GridBefore the Blackout Began .......................................................... 23Summary...................................................................... 23Electric Demands on August 14 .................................................... 25Generation Facilities Unavailable on August 14........................................ 25Unanticipated Outages of Transmission and Generation on August 14 ...................... 27Key Parameters for the Cleveland-Akron Area at 15:05 EDT .............................. 27Power Flow Patterns ............................................................. 28Voltages and Voltage Criteria ...................................................... 31Past System Events and Adequacy of System Studies ................................... 37Model-Based Analysis of the State of the Regional Power System at 15:05 EDT,Before the Loss of FE’s Harding-Chamberlin 345-kV Line ................................ 41System Frequency ............................................................... 43Conclusion .................................................................... 445. How and Why the Blackout Began in Ohio ............................................. 45Summary...................................................................... 45Chapter Organization ............................................................ 45Phase 1: A Normal Afternoon Degrades: 12:15 EDT to 14:14 EDT .......................... 45Phase 2: FE’s Computer Failures: 14:14 EDT to 15:59 EDT ................................ 51Phase 3: Three FE 345-kV Transmission Line Failures and Many Phone Calls:15:05 EDT to 15:57 EDT........................................................... 57Phase 4: 138-kV Transmission System Collapse in Northern Ohio: 15:39 to 16:08 EDT ......... 686. The Cascade Stage of the Blackout .................................................... 73Phase 5: 345-kV Transmission System Cascade in Northern Ohio and South-Central Michigan . . 77Phase 6: The Full Cascade ......................................................... 82Phase 7: Several Electrical Islands Formed in Northeast U.S. and Canada: 16:10:46 EDTto 16:12 EDT ................................................................... 90Why the Blackout Stopped Where It Did ............................................. 91Under-Frequency and Under-Voltage Load-Shedding ................................... 92Why the Generators Tripped Off.................................................... 937. The August 14 Blackout Compared With Previous Major North American Outages .............103Incidence and Characteristics of Power System Outages .................................103Outage Descriptions and Major Causal Factors.........................................104Common or Similar Factors Among Major Outages .....................................107Comparisons With the August 14 Blackout ...........................................110Contents (Continued) PageAppendixesTablesFiguresivG U.S.-Canada Power System Outage
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