HARVARD DPI 403 - Constitutional choices

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Constitutional choicesConsensus v. majoritarian democraciesLijphart 2Policy AreasyMap ofMap of Program OptionsConstitutions IDEAHuman rights, justice, rule_lawAmnestyDemocratic governanceElectionsACE/UNDPMedia freedomAmnestygovernanceUNDPIFESParlt, tiCivicCPJparties, womenQuotas ProjectPAR, decentralization, anti-corruptionTICivic society, soc capCIVICUSTILijphart 3Class StructureILijphart’stypology oftypes ofI. Lijphart stypology of types of democracyIIMajoritariandemocracyII. Majoritariandemocracy Case study of the UK May 2005 electionIIIConsensus democracyIII.Consensus democracy Case study of the Swiss 2003 election IVDiscussion exerciseIV. Discussion exercise What might be the arguments for adopting either type of democracy for new constitutions in Iraq, Af h i t S d d N l?Afghanistan, Sudan, and Nepal?Lijphart 4Additional resourcesPippa NorrisPippa Norris Driving Democracy (CUP 2008) www pippanorris com (under‘books’)www.pippanorris.com (under books ) Comparative Constitutions Projecthttp://netfiles uiuc edu/zelkins/constitutionshttp://netfiles.uiuc.edu/zelkins/constitutions  International Constitutional Law DocumentsDocuments http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/index.htmlLijphart 5Lijphart 6Lijphart 7Theoretical framework: LijphartjpArendLijphartArendLijphart The Politics of Accommodation (1968)Democracy in Plural Society(1979)Democracy in Plural Society(1979) Democracies (1984) Electoral systems and party systems(1994)ypyy() Institutional design in new democracies (1996) Patterns of Democracy (1999) Thinking about Democracy (2008)Lijphart 8Why focus on constitutions?y Institutions can influence democratic governance e.g. Electoral rules have a mechanical impact on the number of parties in parliament and in governmentpp g Executive-legislative relations influences state capacity for effective governancePotential for practical political reforms e.g.Potential for practical political reforms e.g.  Electoral reform in Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Venezuela Constitution-building in Bosnia, Cambodia, South Africa, Afghanistan, Iraq, Nepal, SudanAfghanistan, Iraq, Nepal, Sudan Peace-settlements in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995, Kosovo 2001, Northern Ireland 1998Lijphart 9ConstitutionsFormal institutionsFormal institutions Written constitutions, legal statutes, administrative decisions, executive decrees, judicial rulings, budgetary allocations Open to short-term political reform Informal institutions Norms, values and common practices which hdtihbhishape and constrain human behavior Open to long-term cultural evolutionLijphart 10Stages of Institutional ReformgState buildingState building Post-conflict peace settlements  E.g. Afghanistan constitution State reform Transition from autocracy Eg Choice of electoral system in post-Communist statesEg Choice of electoral system in postCommunist states  Common in established democracies Improving existing arrangements within a limited set of parameters/options pp eg UK green paper “The Governance of Britain” (2007)Lijphart 11Consociational democracyy Lijphart (1968) The Politics of Accommodation Netherlands exemplified ‘pillorized’ divided society Yet there was stable democracy and elite consensusWhy? Constitutional arrangementsWhy? Constitutional arrangements Executive power-sharing/grand coalition Minority veto in government Proportional representation of all major groups in elected/appointed officeelected/appointed office Cultural autonomy for groups Model for other divided (plural) societies?E g Belgium Switzerland Lebanon CyprusE.g.Belgium, Switzerland, Lebanon, CyprusLijphart 12Normative valuesMajoritarian (Westminster) Consociational democracy()democracy Goals…government accountabilitydemocracy Goals… consensual decision-making bargaining andgovernment accountability and transparency of decision-making  single-party executives,ff ti iti timaking, bargaining and compromise  multiple parliamentary parties, each with a stake in coalition government and effective opposition parties, vigorous parliamentary debate, anddecisive elections.coalition government, and dispersed decision-making processes. Yet dangers of decisive elections. Yet dangers of  elective dictatorship, permanent majorities, g ineffective governance, extreme multiparty fragmentation, l k f t bilit lack of checks and balances.lack of accountability.Lijphart 13The logical sequence of consociational theoryconsociational theoryPR electoral systems or reserved seatsElection ofethnic minoritypartiesPeaceful democratic consolidationGreater support within minority communitiesPlural societiesFederalism & decentralizationElection ofethnic minoritypartiesDoes the logic make sense? Criticisms?Lijphart 14Potential criticisms? For constructivists, ethnic divisions have meanings gshaped by political structures and elites. Power-sharing regimes can thereby freeze/reinforce ethnic cleavages (Donald Horowitz)g Eg Bosnia-Herzegovina By contrast, majoritarian elections force vote-pooling across groups and bridging appeals(Ben Reilly)across groups and bridging appeals (Ben Reilly) Not the only outcome: some peace settlements are negotiated, others result from outright victoryMj it i lti b ff ti iMajoritarian solutions may be more effective in restoring fragile states. Sequencing process in peace settlements? (Mansfield and Snyder)Lijphart 15Types of DemocraciesypSource: Lijphart Democracies (1999)DemocraciesMajoritarian Mixed Consensus(Westminster) (Consociational)egUK?NZld?egUSACtRiegEUBliNew Zealand?BarbadosCosta RicaFranceBelgiumSwitzerlandRef: Arend Lijphart Patterns of Democracy 1999‘Majoritarian’ ModelEffective and accountable‘Consensus’ ModelInclusive and representativepExec-PartiesOne-party cabinetCoalition governmentParliamentExecutive dominantBalanced exec-legislatureParty systemTwo-partyMulti-partyElectoral systemMajoritarianProportional RepresentationInterest groupsPluralistCorporatistFederal-UnitaryFederalUnitaryGovernment Centralized-unitary Decentralized-federalParliamentUnicameralBalanced BicameralParliamentUnicameralBalanced BicameralConstitution Flexible More RigidJudiciaryParlt sovereignJudicial reviewJudiciaryParlt. sovereignJudicial reviewCentral Bank


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