Constitutional choicesConsensus v. majoritarian democraciesLijphart 2Policy AreasyMap ofMap of Program OptionsConstitutions IDEAHuman rights, justice, rule_lawAmnestyDemocratic governanceElectionsACE/UNDPMedia freedomAmnestygovernanceUNDPIFESParlt, tiCivicCPJparties, womenQuotas ProjectPAR, decentralization, anti-corruptionTICivic society, soc capCIVICUSTILijphart 3Class StructureILijphart’stypology oftypes ofI. Lijphart stypology of types of democracyIIMajoritariandemocracyII. Majoritariandemocracy Case study of the UK May 2005 electionIIIConsensus democracyIII.Consensus democracy Case study of the Swiss 2003 election IVDiscussion exerciseIV. Discussion exercise What might be the arguments for adopting either type of democracy for new constitutions in Iraq, Af h i t S d d N l?Afghanistan, Sudan, and Nepal?Lijphart 4Additional resourcesPippa NorrisPippa Norris Driving Democracy (CUP 2008) www pippanorris com (under‘books’)www.pippanorris.com (under books ) Comparative Constitutions Projecthttp://netfiles uiuc edu/zelkins/constitutionshttp://netfiles.uiuc.edu/zelkins/constitutions International Constitutional Law DocumentsDocuments http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/index.htmlLijphart 5Lijphart 6Lijphart 7Theoretical framework: LijphartjpArendLijphartArendLijphart The Politics of Accommodation (1968)Democracy in Plural Society(1979)Democracy in Plural Society(1979) Democracies (1984) Electoral systems and party systems(1994)ypyy() Institutional design in new democracies (1996) Patterns of Democracy (1999) Thinking about Democracy (2008)Lijphart 8Why focus on constitutions?y Institutions can influence democratic governance e.g. Electoral rules have a mechanical impact on the number of parties in parliament and in governmentpp g Executive-legislative relations influences state capacity for effective governancePotential for practical political reforms e.g.Potential for practical political reforms e.g. Electoral reform in Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Venezuela Constitution-building in Bosnia, Cambodia, South Africa, Afghanistan, Iraq, Nepal, SudanAfghanistan, Iraq, Nepal, Sudan Peace-settlements in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995, Kosovo 2001, Northern Ireland 1998Lijphart 9ConstitutionsFormal institutionsFormal institutions Written constitutions, legal statutes, administrative decisions, executive decrees, judicial rulings, budgetary allocations Open to short-term political reform Informal institutions Norms, values and common practices which hdtihbhishape and constrain human behavior Open to long-term cultural evolutionLijphart 10Stages of Institutional ReformgState buildingState building Post-conflict peace settlements E.g. Afghanistan constitution State reform Transition from autocracy Eg Choice of electoral system in post-Communist statesEg Choice of electoral system in postCommunist states Common in established democracies Improving existing arrangements within a limited set of parameters/options pp eg UK green paper “The Governance of Britain” (2007)Lijphart 11Consociational democracyy Lijphart (1968) The Politics of Accommodation Netherlands exemplified ‘pillorized’ divided society Yet there was stable democracy and elite consensusWhy? Constitutional arrangementsWhy? Constitutional arrangements Executive power-sharing/grand coalition Minority veto in government Proportional representation of all major groups in elected/appointed officeelected/appointed office Cultural autonomy for groups Model for other divided (plural) societies?E g Belgium Switzerland Lebanon CyprusE.g.Belgium, Switzerland, Lebanon, CyprusLijphart 12Normative valuesMajoritarian (Westminster) Consociational democracy()democracy Goals…government accountabilitydemocracy Goals… consensual decision-making bargaining andgovernment accountability and transparency of decision-making single-party executives,ff ti iti timaking, bargaining and compromise multiple parliamentary parties, each with a stake in coalition government and effective opposition parties, vigorous parliamentary debate, anddecisive elections.coalition government, and dispersed decision-making processes. Yet dangers of decisive elections. Yet dangers of elective dictatorship, permanent majorities, g ineffective governance, extreme multiparty fragmentation, l k f t bilit lack of checks and balances.lack of accountability.Lijphart 13The logical sequence of consociational theoryconsociational theoryPR electoral systems or reserved seatsElection ofethnic minoritypartiesPeaceful democratic consolidationGreater support within minority communitiesPlural societiesFederalism & decentralizationElection ofethnic minoritypartiesDoes the logic make sense? Criticisms?Lijphart 14Potential criticisms? For constructivists, ethnic divisions have meanings gshaped by political structures and elites. Power-sharing regimes can thereby freeze/reinforce ethnic cleavages (Donald Horowitz)g Eg Bosnia-Herzegovina By contrast, majoritarian elections force vote-pooling across groups and bridging appeals(Ben Reilly)across groups and bridging appeals (Ben Reilly) Not the only outcome: some peace settlements are negotiated, others result from outright victoryMj it i lti b ff ti iMajoritarian solutions may be more effective in restoring fragile states. Sequencing process in peace settlements? (Mansfield and Snyder)Lijphart 15Types of DemocraciesypSource: Lijphart Democracies (1999)DemocraciesMajoritarian Mixed Consensus(Westminster) (Consociational)egUK?NZld?egUSACtRiegEUBliNew Zealand?BarbadosCosta RicaFranceBelgiumSwitzerlandRef: Arend Lijphart Patterns of Democracy 1999‘Majoritarian’ ModelEffective and accountable‘Consensus’ ModelInclusive and representativepExec-PartiesOne-party cabinetCoalition governmentParliamentExecutive dominantBalanced exec-legislatureParty systemTwo-partyMulti-partyElectoral systemMajoritarianProportional RepresentationInterest groupsPluralistCorporatistFederal-UnitaryFederalUnitaryGovernment Centralized-unitary Decentralized-federalParliamentUnicameralBalanced BicameralParliamentUnicameralBalanced BicameralConstitution Flexible More RigidJudiciaryParlt sovereignJudicial reviewJudiciaryParlt. sovereignJudicial reviewCentral Bank
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