17 42 MIT poli sci dept Stephen Van Evera THE CAUSES OF INTENSE WAR I THE MYSTERY OF LIMITED INTENSE WAR Some wars are total from the outset like World War I Some start quietly but end with a bang like World War II in Europe which opened with the near bloodless 1939 40 Sitzkrieg but became total Some remain limited like Korea and Vietnam Why II SEVEN COMMON HYPOTHESES ON LIMITED WAR A Destructive Weapons Cause Destructive War and its less popular opposite Mutual Deterrence Prevents Destructive War Consider four hypotheses on arms and the intensity of war 1 States destroy what they can The violence of war corresponds to the destructive power of states 2 States destroy what they cannot avoid destroying The violence of war depends on whether weapons are discriminating e g accurate or not 3 States destroy what they must to accomplish their war goals The violence of war corresponds to the scope of those goals and hence to the scope of political conflict between the belligerents 4 States destroy least when they fear large punishment in return The violence of war corresponds inversely to the ability of both belligerents to punish the other Note Propositions A1 and A2 produce opposite prescriptions from A4 Indeed A1 and A4 are logical mirror opposites What to make of this Solutions implied by Proposition A1 Disarmament Deploy forces that can disarm the other side e g strategic nuclear counterforce forces accurate silo busting ICBMs and national missile defense Solutions implied by Proposition A2 Deploy discriminating weapons that can be used without collateral damage e g laser guided bombs Ban land mines especially hardto clear anti personnel mines and weapons of mass destruction Solution implied by Proposition A3 All states should adopt defensive force postures so that their neighbors will not be insecure hence will not feel the need to adopt desperate measures in a search for security Solution implied by Proposition A4 States should arm themselves abundantly with well protected weapons of mass destruction Nuclear weapons are your friend Wars of counterinsurgency will be especially violent as they are wars in which governments and insurgents compete to coerce unarmed publics The publics cannot punish either government or insurgents so violence directed at them is intense B C D Total War Doctrine Causes Total War Limited War Doctrines Allow Limited War Defining and Observing Thresholds Helps Keep War Limited e g I won t use gas if you won t Don t destroy your opponent s command control communications and intelligence C3I otherwise they can t observe your restraint or make peace with you III CAUSES OF WAR AS CAUSES OF ESCALATION A First strike advantages When these exist wars 1 Start at an intense level Cf the 1941 Japanese attack on the U S the 1941 German attack on the USSR and the 1967 Arab Israeli war Compare with the slow growing 1939 war in Europe U S in Vietnam Are fought intensely as each attacks before it is attacked Widen as belligerents preempt neutrals Cf the German invasion of Norway 1940 4 Are harder to stop due to the treachery displayed by a surprise attack why should the attacker now be trusted to keep peace Large windows i e fluctuations in relative power When these exist wars 1 Start at an intense level Cf World War I 1941 Pacific War 2 Escalate as states jump through windows of opportunity in wartime Cf Hitler s 1940 attack on France Germany s 1918 offensive 3 Widen as neutrals jump in to exploit war caused windows Note windows also make war more barbaric Belligerents often massacre POWs and populations for preventive reasons i e otherwise they will escape and rejoin the fight See e g the 1976 massacre of Tal Zataar in Lebanon Moreover such horrors make losers fight to the end False optimism This makes war 1 Persist see e g World War I World War II Vietnam 2 Escalate see e g the German 1917 submarine campaign and the Athenians Syracusan expedition in the Peloponnesian War 3 Widen Cumulative resources When resources are cumulative states struggle to control them for themselves and to destroy them in order to deny them to their opponent These two motives drive much wartime destruction Offense vs Defense Does a strong offense make war more or less intense 1914 1918 vs 1792 1939 2 3 B C D D IV WARFIGHTING STRATEGY AND ESCALATION Do offensive operations cause or dampen escalation The U S rush to the Yalu 1950 the Cold War debate over offense in U S war plans B Military operations open windows Example France tempted Admiral Boscawen s attack in 1756 A self opened window A V VI DOES WAR BEGET WAR IF SO WHY A War aims may expand in wartime as each side adopts a darker image of the other s intentions B The use of force is blackmail but states pay large reputation costs if they concede to blackmail So using force makes others less as well as more willing to concede C War creates false optimism Belligerents optimism grows as they fight D States at war feed hyper nationalism and chauvinist mythmaking E Wartime non evaluation 1 Critical assessment of official policy becomes aid and comfort to the enemy and in fact it is Question should wartime dissent therefore be suppressed 2 Ingroup outgroup dynamics get going Those who find fault with official policies are excoriated for the crime of sowing disunity in the tribe Hence war policies are not properly evaluated 3 Wartime breakdown of communication between adversaries no external evaluation of each side s domestic debate lopsided debates on war aims Hawks can lie unanswered about the enemy F Sunk cost dynamics and ego investment by elites who can t admit they were wrong G War creates a popular desire for vengeance An emotional factor H Do Cleon s the military other hawks wield more political power in wartime A missing concept in wartime The Treason of the Hawks Collaborating with enemies is reviled as treason but ruining one s country in avoidable warfare is a crime with no name and no punishment WHAT WILL WORLD WAR III BE LIKE AND THE INTENSITY OF WAR THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION BIO REVOLUTION MIT OpenCourseWare http ocw mit edu 17 42 Causes and Prevention of War Spring 2009 For information about citing these materials or our Terms of Use visit http ocw mit edu terms