155 Essay Law and the Humanities: An Uneasy Relationship Jack M. Balkin* and Sanford Levinson** I. INTRODUCTION: IS LAW PART OF THE HUMANITIES? A TALE OF TWO SPEECHES1 In 1930, Judge Learned Hand, widely regarded as one of the most distinguished judges in our nation’s history, spoke to the Juristic Society at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. In his address, “Sources of Tolerance,” he told his listeners I venture to believe that it is as important to a judge called upon to * Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law School. ** W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood., Jr., Centennial Chair in Law, and Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin. 1. We originally wrote this essay for a project sponsored by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences on the current state of the humanities. Other essays written for the project considered the state of contemporary history, philosophy, comparative literature, African-American studies, and English literature. All were recently published, including a shorter version of this essay, in Daedalus. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law & the Humanities, Spring 2006 DÆDALUS 105 (2006). We thought it appropriate to focus on whether law merited a place in such a project; that is, what, if anything, made law one of the “humanities” in the twenty-first century.156 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 18:155 pass on a question of constitutional law, to have at least a bowing acquaintance with Acton and Maitland, with Thucydides, Gibbon, and Carlyle, with Homer, Dante, Shakespeare and Milton, with Machiavelli, Montaigne and Rabelais, with Plato, Bacon, Hume and Kant, as with the books which have been specifically written on the subject.2 Hand’s remarks assume three points that form the central focus of this essay. The first is that the study of law is either part of or is strongly connected to the humanities. The second is that the lawyer or legal scholar called upon to discuss and analyze legal questions cannot do so by looking merely within the confines of traditional legal materials: cases, statutes, and “books which have been specifically written on the subject” of law. Instead, he or she needs assistance and edification from other sources. The third is that those external sources of knowledge are to be found not in the natural sciences or the social sciences, but in subjects that we customarily call “the humanities.” Hand is not merely assuming these things. He also presents himself to us as a wise jurist who has been influenced by the “great books” he has selected for our attention. Because he is himself familiar with each of the writers he mentions, he enjoys membership in a “republic of letters,” the sort of membership that is necessary for anyone who wishes to “live greatly in the law.”3 There was nothing particularly unusual about these assumptions in the early twentieth century, particularly coming from an elite member of the legal profession like Hand. Moreover, membership in the American republics of law and letters had run both ways. Robert Ferguson’s important book, Law and Letters in American Culture, discusses the many late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century American writers who had been trained as lawyers (and in many instances, had actually practiced law), including Charles Brockden Brown, Hugh Henry Brackenridge, Washington Irving, William Bryant, and James Fenimore Cooper.4 One might also think of Hand’s contemporary, the Harvard Law School-educated poet Archibald McLeish, or, closer to our own time, writers ranging from Louis Auchincloss to Scott Turow and John Grisham. Nonetheless, few legal scholars today share Hand’s assumptions; indeed, these assumptions were already under attack at the turn of the twentieth century. Consider what is perhaps the most important single 2. LEARNED HAND, THE SPRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 81 (1951). 3. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Profession of the Law: Conclusion of a Lecture Delivered to Undergraduates of Harvard University on February 17, 1886, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, 29, 30 (1921). 4. ROBERT FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1984); see also MICHAEL MELTZER, SECULAR REVELATIONS: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND CLASSIC AMERICAN LITERATURE (2005).2006] Balkin & Levinson 157 lecture in the history of American law: “The Path of the Law,” 5 delivered by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who had taught briefly at Harvard Law School before fleeing to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Speaking in June 1897 before the students and faculty of the Boston University School of Law, Holmes predicted that “[f]or the rational study of the law the black-letter man [i.e., the master of legal case law] may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics.”6 Holmes and Hand were friends, but they clearly disagreed about the future direction (or path) of the law. While Hand advocated the study of the humanities, Holmes advocated the study of the social sciences, particularly economics. Although Hand made his remarks a generation after Holmes’s, his vision of interdisciplinarity was in some ways an older one that saw a career in the law as continuous with membership in a republic of letters. From the vantage point of a full century after Holmes’s address and seventy-five years following Hand’s, one can confidently state, whether regretfully or not, that Hand’s assumptions—that law is centrally located in the humanities, and is not complete unless it draws nourishment from them—no longer seem so obvious. One reason may lie in the development of the American college curriculum after World War II, when colleges and universities were transformed from bastions of the upper classes to venues where middle class students—and even occasional members of the lower classes—could seek an education that previously was rarely accessible to them. One could no longer assume that law school matriculants had studied the Iliad and the Odyssey in English, let alone in the original Greek. A second reason is the change in the structure of what is today aptly called the “legal services industry.” Although there certainly continue to be substantial numbers of small-town general practitioners, “boutique” firms, prosecutors, criminal defense lawyers, legal academics,