CMSC 426-626: Common Criteria for Computer/IT SystemsCommon CriteriaNIAPSecurity concepts and relationshipsEvaluation concepts & relationshipsCC ProcessCC Protection profile (in Combined Federal Criteria)CC Protection ProfileWhat happens with PP?CC PackageSecurity Target, contd.Security Target (per Comb Fed Crit.)Security TargetSlide 14Classes in Common CriteriaClassesClasses, contd.ComponentsEAL LevelsEAL Levels, contd.1CMSC 426-626:Common Criteria for Computer/IT SystemsProf. Krishna SivalingamOct 23, 20062Common CriteriaCommoncriteria.orgCommoncriteriaportal.org•Lists CC v3.1 (and older versions)Originally released in 1998An International Standards Organisation (ISO) standard for security evaluation of software productsIT product vendors use the CC as a benchmark for product security3NIAPNational Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) is a joint venture between NIST (nist.gov) and NSA (nsa.gov)Goal: “increase the level of consumer trust in information systems and networks” from http://www.nsa.gov/ia/industry/niap.cfmOne service: Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) that “focuses on meeting the security testing, evaluation, and assessment needs of both IT products and consumers.”4Security concepts and relationshipsFrom CC Part 1 (of v3.1)5Evaluation concepts & relationshipsFrom CC Part 1 (of v3.1)6CC ProcessA user creates Packages or “Protection Profile” for a desired security productThe PP describes the product’s protection needsWritten by the user (e.g. government, banking industry, vendor’s marketing group, product inventor)Describes security aspects needed in an IT product7CC Protection profile (in Combined Federal Criteria)Rationale•Protection policy and regulations•Information protection philosophy•Expected threats•Environmental assumptions•Intended UseFunctionality•Security Features•Security Services•Available security mechanismsAssurance•Profile-specific assurances•Profile-independent assurancesDependencies•Internal•External8CC Protection ProfileIntroductionProduct/System Family Description: Generic description of family of products.Product/System Family Security Environment – intended use, environment of use, threats to assets, organizational security policies, etc.Security ObjectivesIT Security Requirements – Functional and AssuranceRationale9What happens with PP?A vendor develops an IT product based on the requirements set in the PPVendor then prepares a “security target” document that describes the security and assurance aspects of the product.•Can relate Security Target to Specs. In the Protection ProfileSecurity Target can also be written independent of a PP and sold along with the IT product10CC PackageA package is a named set of security requirements. A package is either •a functional package, containing only SFRs (Security Functional Requirements) or •an assurance package, containing only SARs (Security Assurace Requirements) •But, not both.Examples of Assurance packages are the EALs (Evaluation Assurance Level), than run from EAL1 (lowest) through EAL7 (highest)•EAL1 through EAL4 are most common11Security Target, contd.From CC, part I: “The Security Target begins with describing the assets and the threats to those assets. The Security Target then describes the countermeasures (in the form of Security Objectives) and demonstrates that these countermeasures are sufficient to counter these threats: if the countermeasures do what they claim to do, the threats are countered.”12Security Target (per Comb Fed Crit.)Rationale•Implementation fundamentals•Information protection philosophy•Countered Threats•Environmental Assumptions•Intended UseFunctionality•Security features•Security services•Security mechanisms selectedAssurance•Target-specific assurances•Target-independent assurancesDependencies•Internal•External13Security TargetIntroduction: description of the target of evaluation (TOE) at three different abstraction levelsConformance: If the ST is conformant with any PPs or packagesSecurity problem definition: Threats, Assumptions, etc. Security objectives:Extended components definition: describes components not described in Part 2 or Part 3 of CC documentSecurity requirements: Present security objectives in standard requirements formatTOE Summary specifications: How functional requirements are implemented and met and how assurance reqts. Are metRationale: Sec Objectives Rationale, Sec. Reqts. Rationale, TOE Summary Spec. Rationale, etc.Before and during evaluation, ST states “what is to be evaluated?”After evaluation, ST states “what was evaluated?”14From CC Part 1 (of v3.1)15Classes in Common CriteriaFunctionality (11)•Security audit (FAU)•Communications (FCO)•Crypto support (FCS)•User data protection (FDP)•Identification & Authentication (FIA)•Sec. Mgmt (FMT)•Privacy (FPR)•Protection of trusted security functions (FPT)•Resource utilization (FRU)•Trusted Path (FTP)•TOE Access (FTA)Assurance (10)•Configuration Management•Delivery and operation•Development•Guidance documents•Life-cycle support•Testing•Vulnerability Assessment•Maintenance of Assurance•Protection profile evaluation•Security target evaluation16ClassesClasses are broken down into families, which are broken down into components17Classes, contd.18Components19EAL LevelsEAL1: Functionally TestedEAL2: Structurally Tested; Applicable to systems with low-moderate assurance needs, but not enough development record (e.g legacy systems)•Based on High-Level Design Analysis & Sec. Fn. AnalysisEAL3: Methodically Tested & Checked•Use of devt. Environment controls and config. MgtEAL4: Methodically Designed, Tested & Reviewed•Includes Low-level design, complete interface description, and subset of implementation•Informal model of security policy•Windows 2000, XP, Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) Version 4 Update 1 AS and Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) Version 4 Update 1 WS20EAL Levels, contd.EAL5: Semi-formally Designed and TestedEAL6: Semi-formally Verified Design and TestedEAL7: Formally Verified Design and Tested•Formal functional spec. and high-level design•Implementation representation be used as testing basis•Independent confirmation of developer’s test