Econ 522 – Economics of Law, Fall 2008Dan QuintHomework 3 – Tort LawDue 1 p.m. sharp, Thursday December 4QUESTION 1 – BILATERAL PRECAUTIONConsider the following setting of bilateral precaution. Bicyclists who ride at night can reduce therisk of getting hit by a car by wearing reflective vests. Drivers can reduce the risk of hitting a bicyclist by installing HID (High Intensity Discharge) headlights, which are brighter than normalheadlights. Imagine there’s only one driver and one bicyclist, and the likelihood of an accident isas follows:Injurer PrecautionNormalHeadlightsHIDHeadlightsVictim Precaution No Vest 8% 3%Vest 5% 1%The damage done by an accident is $1,000, and compensation is perfect. Reflective vests cost $15, and HID bulbs cost $30. There is no insurance – drivers bear their own liability costs.(a) What is the efficient level of precaution by both sides? (No calculus needed, just compute the total social cost – expected cost of accidents plus precaution – under the fourpossible combinations.)(b) What levels of precaution by both parties will a rule of no liability lead to?(c) What levels of precaution will a rule of strict liability lead to?(d) Show that, regardless of what the bicyclist does, it’s efficient for the driver to use HID bulbs; and regardless of what the driver does, it’s efficient for the bicyclist to wear a vest.(e) What levels of precaution would a rule of simple negligence lead to?(f) What levels of precaution would a rule of strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence lead to?(g) Who bears the residual risk of accidents (pays the cost of those accidents that still occur) under simple negligence? What about negligence with a defense of contributory negligence?(h) What can you say about the levels of driver and bicyclist activity under these two rules?QUESTION 2 – NICE DOCTORSStudies have shown that even in cases of clear negligence, patients are less likely to sue doctors who they like, that is, doctors who treat them kindly and are apologetic when things go wrong.(a) First, imagine a world where doctors do not have liability insurance. In order to face correct incentives for precaution, should “nice” doctors be subject to higher punitive damages when they get sued? Explain.(b) Next, imagine a world where doctors do have liability insurance, and pay their own premiums, which go up each time they are successfully sued. In this world, explain why you might not want to be treated by a nice doctor.QUESTION 3 – EGGSHELL SKULLSOne of my students last year called my attention to the case of Vosburg v Putney, an 1891 Wisconsin. Putney, age 11, kicked Vosburg, age 14, in the leg.during school. The kick was not very hard – the jury found that "defendant, in touching the plaintiff with his foot, did not intend to do him any harm" – but Vosburg was recovering from an earlier sledding injury to the same spot, and the light kick somehow caused Vosburg to permanently lose the use of his leg. The court ruled that, even though Putney had no way of knowing Vosburg was so fragile, he (his parents) was liable for the harm done.This is an example of the “eggshell skull” principle in tort law – even if someone has a skull as fragile as an eggshell, if you tap them on the head and break their skull, you’re still liable. This is also described as the doctrine that “we take our victims as we find them.”(a) If we assume that people are aware of their own frailties, how does this compare to the ruling in Hadley v Baxendale? Do you see a reason for the difference?(b) An alternative rule would be for injurers to be held liable for the harm their actions wouldhave done to a “typical” victim, not the victim they actually injured. Which rule seems better to you?
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