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3Kenneth L. SokoloffThe Evolution of SuffrageInstitutions in the New World:A Preliminary LookIt has long been recognized that the conduct of elections, includingwho holds the right to vote, is one of the most crucial of institutions.Varying the rules or organization of how votes are cast and of whocasts them can have a fundamental impact on the policy choicesthat the elected representatives—who in some sense constitute thecollective government—make. In so doing, there are often majorimplications for how a society’s resources or wealth are distributedacross the population, as well perhaps for the pace of economicgrowth. Given what is at stake, it should not be surprising thatthroughout history many have fought and died over both the designof the rules and the outcomes of elections.In recent years there has been an increased appreciation of howdemocratic rules for electing government representatives mightcontribute to different paths of development. A number of specificmechanisms have been identified. Many scholars have emphasizedthe relation between degree of democracy, or the distribution ofpolitical influence, and the distribution of income, with reference tohow a broader extension of the franchise would lead to differenttypes of tax systems, provisions of public services, legal and regula-tory frameworks, levels of corruption, and trade policies than wouldHoover Press : Haber DP5 HPCRON0300 01-07-:2 10:33:43 rev2 page 75regimes based on greater concentration of political influence.1Atleast implicit in these treatments have been suggestions that poli-cies with effects on distribution might have indirect consequenceson the prospects for long-term economic growth as well. Somehave focused on potential negative consequences, such as the dis-incentives for investment that are created by progressive or higherrates of taxation, or by other infringements on insecure propertyrights to the streams of income from investments. Where an eco-nomic elite wields highly disproportionate political power, or a po-litical elite exploits its position for economic advantage, a broaden-ing of political influence through an extension of the franchisemight diminish the returns to members of the elite and dampentheir rates of investment.2On the other hand, there could well beadvantages for growth to having a more equal distribution of polit-ical influence. Many would expect, for example, more substantialsupport of infrastructure and other public goods and services (thatwould augment the returns to investment by segments of the pop-ulation outside the elite), a reduction in levels of corruption, andperhaps more competition throughout the economy (with associ-ated improvements in the allocation of resources and in transac-tions costs).31. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. George Lawrence, ed. J.P. Mayer (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969). For other more recent examples ofa vast literature, see Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, “Why Did WesternEurope Extend the Franchise?” working paper, Massachuetts Institute of Technol-ogy and University of California, Berkeley, 2000; Robert J. Barro, Determinants ofEconomic Growth (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1997); andRoberto Perotti, “Growth, Income Distribution, and Democracy,” Journal of Eco-nomic Growth 1 (1996): 149–87.2. Alberto F. Alesina and Dani Rodrik, “Distributive Politics and EconomicGrowth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (1994): 465–90; and Torsten Perrsonand Guido Tabellini, “Is Inequality Harmful for Growth? Theory and Evidence,”American Economic Review 84 (1994): 600–21.3. Acemoglu and Robinson, “Why Did Western Europe Extend the Fran-chise?”; Roland Benabou, “Unequal Societies: Income Distribution and the SocialHoover Press : Haber DP5 HPCRON0300 01-07-:2 10:33:43 rev2 page 7676KENNETH L. SOKOLOFFMost of the systematic analysis on how the distribution of polit-ical power affects the patterns of growth has been confined to ourexperience over the late–twentieth century.4This work has madeimportant contributions to our knowledge, but there has been rel-atively little investigation of earlier periods (largely because of thelack of comparable data). One of the problems associated with thefocus on the modern record is that examinations of processes thattake place over the long run are hampered. A central example ofthis deficiency is the difficulty of studying where institutions likethose that establish the distribution of political power come from.We may all agree that institutions have an impact on growth, butour interpretation of this relationship will vary with our understand-ing of where institutions come from; in particular, to what extentare institutions exogenous and to what extent are they endogenous(and with respect to which conditions and processes).This chapter is intended to make a modest contribution to-ward the goal of improving our knowledge of where institutionshave come from by surveying how the rules governing the exten-sion of suffrage, a measure of the distribution of political power,have differed across the countries of North and South Americaand evolved over time within them. Because of the enormousshocks to these societies associated with European colonization ofthe New World, and because of the substantial variation amongthem in their initial characteristics and outcomes, such an exami-nation has the potential for improving our understanding of theconditions that over the long run give rise to more democraticContract,” American Economic Review 90 (2000): 96–129; and Gilles Saint-Paul andThierry Verdier, “Education, Democracy, and Growth,” Journal of Development Eco-nomics 42 (1993): 399–407.4. The construction and maintenance of a rich cross-country data set for thisperiod has been an enormous boon to scholars in this area. See Robert Summersand Alan Heston, “The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of Interna-tional Comparisons, 1950–1988,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106 (1991): 327–68.Hoover Press : Haber DP5 HPCRON0300 01-07-:2 10:33:43 rev2 page 7777The Evolution of Suffrage Institutions in the New Worldpolitical institutions. Moreover, it should also allow us a betterchance to get at the underlying processes that relate the degreeof political democracy or equality to the evolution of strategiceconomic institutions and to economic development more gen-erally.That there was extreme variation across the New World in


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UNCW PLS 333 - Literacy 75

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