US Civil War: Moves Toward Total WarID & SIG:Scott’s Anaconda PlanWinfield Scott and Limited WarSlide 5The Peninsula CampaignPeninsula Campaign: George McClellanPeninsula Campaign: Joe JohnstonPeninsula Campaign: Faulty IntelligencePeninsula CampaignPeninsula Campaign: SecurityPeninsula Campaign: Mass and SecurityPeninsula Campaign: Confederate DefensesPeninsula Campaign: YorktownPeninsula Campaign: Confederate WithdrawalJackson’s Valley CampaignSlide 17Slide 18Peninsula Campaign: Seven PinesSlide 20Robert E. LeeSlide 22Seven DaysSlide 24Harrison’s Landing LetterSlide 26End of the Peninsula CampaignPope’s General OrdersSlide 29End of the Peninsula Campaign and Lee’s OffensiveLee and the Turning MovementSecond ManassasSlide 33Slide 34Slide 35AntietamSlide 37Slide 38Slide 39Slide 40The End of ConciliationMoves toward EmancipationEmancipation ProclamationSlide 44Diplomatic ImpactNext LessonUS Civil War:Moves Toward Total WarLesson 12ID & SIG:•objective, McClellan, Peninsula Campaign, Antietam, conciliation, Emancipation Proclamation, Pope, Harrison Landing letter, Stuart, Anaconda Plan, Lee, Second ManassasScott’s Anaconda Plan•Aging Mexican War hero Winfield Scott was still on active duty when the Civil War broke out and he was responsible for recommending the initial Federal strategy•Reflecting his Mexican War experience with limited war, Scott proposed the “Anaconda Plan” which would build a massive army, establish a blockade, secure the Mississippi River to cut the South in two, and waitWinfield Scott and Limited War•Scott argued that his plan “will thus cut off the luxuries to which the people are accustomed; and when they feel the pressure, not having been exasperated by attacks made on them within their respective States, the Union spirit will assert itself; those who are on the fence will descend on the Union side, and I will guarantee that in one year from this time all difficulties will be settled.”Winfield Scott and Limited War•If, on the other hand, Lincoln chose to invade the South, Scott predicted, “I will guarantee that at the end of a year you will be further from a settlement than you are now.” –Indeed, Lincoln would have to always bear in mind that too much damage inflicted on the South and its people would imperil the reunification that was his object. –Nonetheless Lincoln rejected Scott’s plan because it would take too long and instead an “On to Richmond” strategy gained ascendancyThe Peninsula CampaignPeninsula Campaign: George McClellan•Among the Army’s best educated officers… “the Young Napoleon”•Excellent organizer and administrator–The right man to rebuild the Federal Army after the defeat at First Manassas•Extremely cautious; always wants more troops and more time to prepare–Prone to believe enemy is stronger than he really is•Mutual distrust with Lincoln•Strong experience with sieges (Vera Cruz and Sevastopol)• Advocated the limited war and the conciliatory approachesPeninsula Campaign: Joe Johnston•Reinforced Beauregard at First Manassas•Highest ranking officer to leave the US Army for the Confederacy–However the letter Davis sent to the Senate requesting confirmation of his full generals listed Johnston fourth–This infuriated Johnston and from that day on he had a difficult and quarrelsome relationship with Davis•Defensive-mindedPeninsula Campaign: Faulty Intelligence•McClellan near Washington with 100,000 men•Johnston near Centreville with 40,000–Allan Pinkerton, McClellan’s intelligence officer, estimated Johnston had 150,000•Pinkerton’s exaggerated estimate reinforced McClellan’s natural tendency toward cautionPinkerton’s (left) skill in running a railroad detective agency did not translate to being a good military intelligence officerPeninsula Campaign•McClellan hoped to avoid attacking Johnston frontally•Instead he hoped to insert himself between Johnston and Richmond, forcing Johnston to evacuate his strong Manassas-Centreville line in order to defend the Confederate capital•Johnston evacuated before McClellan could implement his first plan to land at Urbanna, so McClellan changed his landing site to Fort MonroePeninsula Campaign: Security•Lincoln was not overly enthusiastic about the Peninsula Campaign but he was happy that McClellan was at least doing something•Among Lincoln’s concerns was the safety of Washington after McClellan’s army departed•He asked McClellan to explain his plan for safeguarding the capital and McClellan never really gave Lincoln a straight answer–McClellan was very condescending to Lincoln–He seemed to think that as a professional soldier he did not need to bother sharing his plans with an amateurPeninsula Campaign: Mass and Security•Amphibious movement began March 17–121,500 men, 14,492 animals, 1,224 wagons, 200 cannon–One British observer described it as “the stride of a giant” (mass)•On April 3 Lincoln started asking serious questions about the safety of Washington and became convinced it was inadequate–He ordered McDowell’s 30,000 man corps to remain in place rather than join McClellan (security)McClellan’s failure to make Lincoln feel comfortable about Washington came back to haunt himPeninsula Campaign: Confederate Defenses•McClellan began his advance inland on April 4•Facing him was a 13,000 man force commanded by John Magruder•While Magruder was executing a masterful deception of McClellan, Lee, as President Davis’s military advisor, was able to begin a “reconcentration” of forces which would ultimately bring 53,000 Confederates into position to oppose McClellan (balance)Peninsula Campaign: Yorktown•Magruder’s deception, poor maps, difficult terrain, uninspired actions by subordinates, Pinkerton’s exaggerated reports, and McClellan’s natural caution led him to stop his advance within 24 hours and begin siege operations against Yorktown •Joe Johnston said, “Nobody but McClellan would have hesitated to attack.”Mortars used in the Federal siege of YorktownPeninsula Campaign: Confederate Withdrawal•On March 8-9 the Monitor and the Virginia fought the Battle of Hampton Roads•On May 3 Johnston began to evacuate Yorktown and withdraw up the Peninsula–This opened up the York and James Rivers to Federal gunboats, especially after the Confederates were forced to scuttle the VirginiaCurrier and Ives print of the destruction of the VirginiaJackson’s Valley