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Berkeley COMPSCI 188 - Lecture 8: Utilities / MDPs

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1CS 188: Artificial IntelligenceFall 2011Lecture 8: Utilities / MDPs9/20/2011Dan Klein – UC BerkeleyMany slides over the course adapted from either Stuart Russell or Andrew Moore1Maximum Expected Utility Why should we average utilities? Why not minimax? Principle of maximum expected utility: A rational agent should chose the action which maximizes its expected utility, given its knowledge Questions: Where do utilities come from? How do we know such utilities even exist? Why are we taking expectations of utilities (not, e.g. minimax)? What if our behavior can’t be described by utilities?22Utilities: Uncertain Outcomes3Going to airport from homeGetSingleGetDoubleOops WhewPreferences An agent chooses among: Prizes: A, B, etc. Lotteries: situations with uncertain prizes Notation:43Rational Preferences Preferences of a rational agent must obey constraints. The axioms of rationality: Theorem: Rational preferences imply behavior describable as maximization of expected utility5MEU Principle Theorem: [Ramsey, 1931; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944] Given any preferences satisfying these constraints, there exists a real-valued function U such that: Maximum expected utility (MEU) principle: Choose the action that maximizes expected utility Note: an agent can be entirely rational (consistent with MEU) without ever representing or manipulating utilities and probabilities E.g., a lookup table for perfect tictactoe, reflex vacuum cleaner64Utility Scales Normalized utilities: u+= 1.0, u-= 0.0 Micromorts: one-millionth chance of death, useful for paying to reduce product risks, etc. QALYs: quality-adjusted life years, useful for medical decisions involving substantial risk Note: behavior is invariant under positive linear transformation With deterministic prizes only (no lottery choices), only ordinal utilitycan be determined, i.e., total order on prizes7Human Utilities Utilities map states to real numbers. Which numbers? Standard approach to assessment of human utilities: Compare a state A to a standard lottery Lpbetween “best possible prize” u+with probability p “worst possible catastrophe” u-with probability 1-p Adjust lottery probability p until A ~ Lp Resulting p is a utility in [0,1]85Money Money does not behave as a utility function, but we can talk about the utility of having money (or being in debt) Given a lottery L = [p, $X; (1-p), $Y] The expected monetary value EMV(L) is p*X + (1-p)*Y U(L) = p*U($X) + (1-p)*U($Y) Typically, U(L) < U( EMV(L) ): why? In this sense, people are risk-averse When deep in debt, we are risk-prone Utility curve: for what probability pam I indifferent between: Some sure outcome x A lottery [p,$M; (1-p),$0], M large9Example: Insurance Consider the lottery [0.5,$1000; 0.5,$0] What is its expected monetary value? ($500) What is its certainty equivalent? Monetary value acceptable in lieu of lottery $400 for most people Difference of $100 is the insurance premium There’s an insurance industry because people will pay to reduce their risk If everyone were risk-neutral, no insurance needed!106Example: Human Rationality? Famous example of Allais (1953) A: [0.8,$4k; 0.2,$0] B: [1.0,$3k; 0.0,$0] C: [0.2,$4k; 0.8,$0] D: [0.25,$3k; 0.75,$0] Most people prefer B > A, C > D But if U($0) = 0, then B > A ⇒ U($3k) > 0.8 U($4k) C > D ⇒ 0.8 U($4k) > U($3k)11Non-Deterministic Search12How do you plan when your actions might fail?7Example: Grid World The agent lives in a grid Walls block the agent’s path The agent’s actions do not always go as planned: 80% of the time, the action North takes the agent North (if there is no wall there) 10% of the time, North takes the agent West; 10% East If there is a wall in the direction the agent would have been taken, the agent stays put Small “living” reward each step Big rewards come at the end Goal: maximize sum of rewards*[DEMO – Gridworld Intro]Action Results14Deterministic Grid World Stochastic Grid WorldXXE N S WXE N S W?XX X8Markov Decision Processes An MDP is defined by: A set of states s ∈ S A set of actions a ∈ A A transition function T(s,a,s’) Prob that a from s leads to s’ i.e., P(s’ | s,a) Also called the model A reward function R(s, a, s’)  Sometimes just R(s) or R(s’) A start state (or distribution) Maybe a terminal state MDPs are a family of non-deterministic search problems One way to solve them is with expectimax search – but we’ll have a new tool soon15What is Markov about MDPs? Andrey Markov (1856-1922) “Markov” generally means that given the present state, the future and the past are independent For Markov decision processes, “Markov” means:9Solving MDPs In deterministic single-agent search problems, want an optimal plan, or sequence of actions, from start to a goal In an MDP, we want an optimal policy π*: S → A A policy π gives an action for each state An optimal policy maximizes expected utility if followed Defines a reflex agent (if precomputed)Optimal policy when R(s, a, s’) = -0.03 for all non-terminals s[Demo]Example Optimal PoliciesR(s) = -2.0R(s) = -0.4R(s) = -0.03R(s) = -0.011810Example: High-Low Rules Three card types: 2, 3, 4 Infinite deck, twice as many 2’s Start with 3 showing After each card, you guess the next card will be “high” or “low” New card is flipped If you’re right, you win the points shown on the new card Ties are no-ops If you’re wrong, game ends How is this different from the “chance” games in last lecture?  #1: get rewards as you go #2: you might play forever!319You can patch expectimaxto deal with #1, but not #2…High-Low as an MDP States: 2, 3, 4, done Actions: High, Low Model: T(s, a, s’): P(s’=4 | 4, Low) = 1/4  P(s’=3 | 4, Low) = 1/4 P(s’=2 | 4, Low) = 1/2 P(s’=done | 4, Low) = 0 P(s’=4 | 4, High) = 1/4  P(s’=3 | 4, High) = 0 P(s’=2 | 4, High) = 0 P(s’=done | 4, High) = 3/4 … Rewards: R(s, a, s’): Number shown on s’ if s ≠ s’ 0 otherwise Start: 3311High-Low: Outcome TreeLowHighHigh LowHigh LowHighLow, Low, HighT = 0.5, R = 2T = 0.25, R = 3T = 0, R = 4T = 0.25, R = 021MDP


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Berkeley COMPSCI 188 - Lecture 8: Utilities / MDPs

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