Cryptography and Network SecurityChapter 20 – FirewallsIntroductionWhat is a Firewall?Firewall LimitationsFirewalls – Packet FiltersSlide 7Slide 8Attacks on Packet FiltersFirewalls – Stateful Packet FiltersFirewalls - Application Level Gateway (or Proxy)Slide 12Firewalls - Circuit Level GatewaySlide 14Bastion HostFirewall ConfigurationsSlide 17Slide 18Access ControlAccess Control MatrixTrusted Computer SystemsBell LaPadula (BLP) ModelReference MonitorEvaluated Computer SystemsSummaryCryptography and Network SecurityThird Editionby William StallingsLecture slides by Lawrie BrownChapter 20 – FirewallsThe function of a strong position is to make the forces holding it practically unassailable—On War, Carl Von ClausewitzIntroduction•seen evolution of information systems•now everyone want to be on the Internet •and to interconnect networks •has persistent security concerns–can’t easily secure every system in org•need "harm minimisation" •a Firewall usually part of thisWhat is a Firewall?•a choke point of control and monitoring •interconnects networks with differing trust•imposes restrictions on network services–only authorized traffic is allowed •auditing and controlling access–can implement alarms for abnormal behavior•is itself immune to penetration•provides perimeter defenceFirewall Limitations•cannot protect from attacks bypassing it–eg sneaker net, utility modems, trusted organisations, trusted services (eg SSL/SSH)•cannot protect against internal threats–eg disgruntled employee•cannot protect against transfer of all virus infected programs or files–because of huge range of O/S & file typesFirewalls – Packet FiltersFirewalls – Packet Filters•simplest of components •foundation of any firewall system •examine each IP packet (no context) and permit or deny according to rules •hence restrict access to services (ports)•possible default policies–that not expressly permitted is prohibited –that not expressly prohibited is permittedFirewalls – Packet FiltersAttacks on Packet Filters•IP address spoofing–fake source address to be trusted–add filters on router to block•source routing attacks–attacker sets a route other than default–block source routed packets•tiny fragment attacks–split header info over several tiny packets–either discard or reassemble before checkFirewalls – Stateful Packet Filters•examine each IP packet in context–keeps tracks of client-server sessions–checks each packet validly belongs to one•better able to detect bogus packets out of contextFirewalls - Application Level Gateway (or Proxy)Firewalls - Application Level Gateway (or Proxy)•use an application specific gateway / proxy •has full access to protocol –user requests service from proxy –proxy validates request as legal –then actions request and returns result to user •need separate proxies for each service –some services naturally support proxying –others are more problematic –custom services generally not supportedFirewalls - Circuit Level GatewayFirewalls - Circuit Level Gateway•relays two TCP connections•imposes security by limiting which such connections are allowed•once created usually relays traffic without examining contents•typically used when trust internal users by allowing general outbound connections•SOCKS commonly used for thisBastion Host•highly secure host system •potentially exposed to "hostile" elements •hence is secured to withstand this •may support 2 or more net connections•may be trusted to enforce trusted separation between network connections•runs circuit / application level gateways •or provides externally accessible servicesFirewall ConfigurationsFirewall ConfigurationsFirewall ConfigurationsAccess Control•given system has identified a user •determine what resources they can access•general model is that of access matrix with–subject - active entity (user, process) –object - passive entity (file or resource) –access right – way object can be accessed•can decompose by–columns as access control lists–rows as capability ticketsAccess Control MatrixTrusted Computer Systems•information security is increasingly important •have varying degrees of sensitivity of information–cf military info classifications: confidential, secret etc •subjects (people or programs) have varying rights of access to objects (information)•want to consider ways of increasing confidence in systems to enforce these rights•known as multilevel security–subjects have maximum & current security level –objects have a fixed security level classificationBell LaPadula (BLP) Model•one of the most famous security models•implemented as mandatory policies on system •has two key policies: •no read up (simple security property)–a subject can only read/write an object if the current security level of the subject dominates (>=) the classification of the object•no write down (*-property)–a subject can only append/write to an object if the current security level of the subject is dominated by (<=) the classification of the objectReference MonitorEvaluated Computer Systems•governments can evaluate IT systems•against a range of standards:–TCSEC, IPSEC and now Common Criteria•define a number of “levels” of evaluation with increasingly stringent checking•have published lists of evaluated products–though aimed at government/defense use–can be useful in industry alsoSummary•have considered:–firewalls–types of firewalls–configurations–access control–trusted