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Berkeley COMPSCI 161 - CS 161 Practice Questions for Final Exam

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Practice Questions for Final Exam Fall 2008 Questions to help you prepare for final exam These are not representative of questions on final exams merely to help you think about the topics in scope The scope of questions knowledge is not limited to those suggested by this questions you must use the lecture notes slides textbooks homeworks projects and other mandatory readings posted on the web page for thorough preparation 1 What is the principle of Least Priv 2 An executable say passwd program that changes user passwords has setuid bit set and is owned by root It is invoked by a user with ID 18 What will be the process s real and effective UIDs at start of the process Suppose it calls exec on a executable that does not have the setuid bit set What will the real and effective UIDs be after the call What happens if the process calls setuid geteuid what access permissions to files will the process have after this 3 What is the difference between setuid and seteuid on Linux when dealing with root and non root real UIDs 4 How do we achieve automatic privilege separation Describe one safe way of handling variables that are inferred both as privileged and unprivileged Does privilege separation remove all possible attacks that caused by buffer overflows give on example that is not stopped 5 Suppose you have a buggy device driver How would you use segmentation registers on Intel x86 to apply hardware fault isolation 6 What are the advantages and disadvantages of SFI over hardware fault isolation 7 How does SFI technique significantly reduce the trusted computing base TCB by using a verifier 8 On the RISC architecture we studied in class all instructions were of fixed size say 4 bytes On x86 instruction sizes may vary between 1 16 bytes and instructions can begin at any byte in the code memory Does the classical SFI technique prevent against attacks where the sandboxed code tries to jump at in middle of an instruction stream If not suggest changes to fix it 9 System call interposition how do we extract a policy for legitimate sequences of system calls given the control flow graph CFG code of the program Suppose the CFG or code is not given you just have access to the program suggest one way to develop the policy to enforce with system call interposition on a application 10 Can you use inline reference monitors for confining actions of browser plugins Explain what properties should you enforce on the mplayer MPEG codec plugin for Firefox 11 System Call interposition based monitors SFI inline checks Virtual machine monitors are all examples of the general concept of monitors 12 How can a infected VM communicate with a listener in another VM using CPU loading unloading 13 Specify two other covert channels in virtual machines assume that the network device and hard disk controller are shared 14 a Can the TPM be used to prevent a virus from modifying the machines Master Boot Record MBR used for bootstrapping the OS without being detected If so explain why If not explain why not b Can the TPM be used to prevent a virus from modifying the machines BIOS boot block without being detected If so explain why If not explain why not c Suppose user A is able to extract the secret AIK signing key from the tamper resistant chip in his machine Explain the implications of this for the va lidity of the attestation process How could A use this key to fool a remote server about the software running on As machine d How would you defend against this problem You may assume that the private key extracted from the chip is published on the web anonymously so that anyone can mount the attack from part c 15 Suppose a music player vendor wishes to allow only CDs sold by that vendor to be played on its player How can it use a special hardware like TPM to achieve this Can it use purely software techniques 16 List atleast one other application of specialized cryptographic hardware other than those mentioned in previous two questions 17 SQL injection can be prevented by using PREPARED statements as seen in the homework Explain what are bind or placeholder parameters used in prepared statement 18 Suggest one way to prevent HTTP response splitting 19 Distinguish between reflected XSS and stored XSS attacks 20 What is the difference between a XSRF vulnerability and a XSS vulnerability 21 You notice that a pizza purchase web site is using a MAC for some part of the data in its cookie What could be this data and why is the MAC being used 22 a State the same origin policy as it applied to the DOM as clearly and precisely as you can in one or two sentences Do the same for the same origin policy as it applies to cookies b Why is it consistent with the same origin policy for content from site A to include an image such as img src http anothersite com picture jpg from another site B c Suppose that web pages from several sites request images from TripleClick com Explain how each site can pass TripleClick some information about the content of the page that will contain the image Write a variant of the HTML img src http tripleclick com picture jpg that passes information to TripleClick as part of the request for a picture d How can TripleClick use the requests you described in part c to build up a database of interests of each web user Explain the browser mechanism that will let TripleClick tell if two requests for images come from the same user and machine even if the user changes IP addresses 23 In Microsoft Internet Explorer 6 This feature is a new attribute for cookies which prevents them from being accessed through client side script A cookie with this attribute is called an httpOnly cookie a What attack are httpOnly cookies intended to prevent Give an example attack that does not work if the site uses httpOnly cookies but works with normal cookies b Show that httpOnly cookies do not eliminate the class of attacks from part b Give an example where httpOnly cookies do not improve security 24 Suppose you have a very old rsh server that only wishes to communicate with a client machine of a known IP address T It naively trusts the TCP protocol design to setup a connection with T when the client connects to the server using TCP the server relies on the TCP 3 way handshake to guarantee that IP address of the client is indeed T and uses no other authentication mechanism Recall from class that the TCP IP 3 way handshake works as follows with C denoting the client and S denoting the rsh server C S SYN X SRC IP T S C SYN Y ACK X DST IP T C


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Berkeley COMPSCI 161 - CS 161 Practice Questions for Final Exam

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