Chapter 1: IntroductionWhy are we here?PowerPoint PresentationLet’s Look at Two ProblemsSuzlon Wind TurbineSlide 6ProblemSlide 8This looks like a technical problem. How do you (as a designer) prevent this from happening?Toyota Accelerator ProblemRecallsSlide 12Slide 13What was the Toyota Problem?Slide 15Slide 16How do we design to avoid technical and nontechnical problems?Course has Three Significant ComponentsGoals of Book and CourseBias of the BookBias of the Teacher SMIU Rules for Good DesignExcellent DesignRole of Structured MethodsSlide 25Slide 28Slide 29Slide 30Slide 31Chapter 1: IntroductionProduct Design and DevelopmentFourth Editionby Karl T. Ulrich and Steven D. EppingerWhy are we here?•How does this course help me be a better engineer?•How does this course fit into the curriculum?We want you to be able to solve problemsTo solve problems, you need •Skills•KnowledgeSome problems are technical and some are not.Let’s Look at Two Problems•Suzlon Wind Turbine Blades•Toyota Accelerator Issues.Suzlon Wind Turbine•In 2008, Suzlon held more than 50 percent of the Indian market for wind and 12.3 percent of the global market.http://www.topnews.in/companies/suzlon-energyProblem•On October 24, 2008 a Suzlon wind turbine in Wyanet Illinois and one of its 140 foot long blades break off.http://gigaom.com/cleantech/holy-breaking-wind-turbines/•Root Cause Analysis and Identification•Suzlon engaged Navigant Consulting, to conduct an extensive Root Cause Analysis (RCA) •While designed and tested to industry standard certification guidelines, the blade had a weakness in the transition area - about 6 meters (20 feet) from the root of the blade. The blades measure 43 meters (142 feet) long and weigh 7 tonnes (15,650 pounds).•At the completion of the program, only 179 blades of the total fleet of 1,251 blades developed cracks. However, Suzlon upgraded the entire fleet in support of its customers.http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/suzlon-completes-blade-retrofit-program-64007317.htmlThis looks like a technical problem.How do you (as a designer) prevent this from happening?Toyota Accelerator Problemhttp://www.toyota.com/recall/videos/pedal-assembly.htmlRecalls•Nov 02, 2009 – US: 3.8 million Toyota and Lexus vehicles again recalled due to floor mat problem, this time for all driver's side mats.[5]•Nov 26, 2009 – US: floor mat recall amended to include brake override[32] and increased to 4.2 million vehicles.[citation needed]•Jan 21, 2010 – US: 2.3 million Toyota vehicles recalled due to faulty accelerator pedals[6] (of those, 2.1 million already involved in floor mat recall).[3]•Jan 27, 2010 – US: 1.1 million Toyotas added to amended floor mat recall.[33]•Jan 29, 2010 – Europe, China: 1.8 million Toyotas added to faulty accelerator pedal recall.[7]Toyota Will Pay Additional $32.425 Million as Result of 2 DOT InvestigationsDec. 20: Toyota has agreed to pay an additional $32.425 million in civil penalties as the result of two separate investigations into the automaker's handling of auto recalls. Toyota will pay the maximum fines allowable under the law - $16.375 million in one case and $16.050 million in the other - in response to the Department's assertion that it failed to comply with the requirements of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act for reporting safety defects to NHTSA.http://www.nhtsa.gov/Vehicle+Safety/Additional+Information+on+Toyota+Recalls+and+Investigationshttp://www.designfax.net/enews/20110301/feature-4.asp Wheels:NASA: "Toyota problem not rocket science"by John Shook, Lean Enterprise Institutehttp://www.nhtsa.gov/UA NHTSA-NASA Study of Unintended Acceleration in Toyota VehiclesWhat was the Toyota Problem?•Mostly NOT technical. (Electronics cleared by NASA)•It was a perception problem.•The problem resulted when the opposition took control of the story.•How do engineers deal with nontechnical problems?http://www.designnews.com/article/455235-Friction_Fundamentals_and_Accelerating_Cars.phpThe accelerator pedal assemblies in the vehicles (Tundras) contained a friction lever made of the polyamide (nylon) 4/6 material.Toyota's investigation found that the material was susceptible to humidity, which could cause the friction lever to absorb moisture and swell. It is well known that nylon is a hygroscopic (water-absorbing) polymer.http://www.designnews.com/article/448825-Poor_Plastic_Selection_Caused_Gas_Pedal_Failures.php?nid=2334&rid=2501252How do we design to avoid technical and nontechnical problems?•How do we select design goals and constraints for an accelerator pedal assembly? (e.g. Grab three other engineers and go to a conference room for an hour.)•How do we explore possible solutions?•How do we select a “best” solution?Course has Three Significant Components•Design Process and Methodology.•Using Statistics to developing and apply Math Models for design (DOE and Robust Design).•Economic Decision MakingGoals of Book and Course•Examine structured approaches to product design and development (e.g. functional decomposition, set-based design, …)•Develop the knowledge and tools to be able to work successfully on cross functional teams (e.g. identify customer needs, intellectual property, economic decision making, …)Bias of the Book•Assumes a For-Profit enterprise•Considers primarily Discrete Goods (printers, and power drills rather than plastic film)•Considers primarily Physical Products rather than engineering services or software.Bias of the TeacherSMIU Rules for Good Design•Does not hurt anyone•Makes money•Works OKExcellent Design•Enhances lives•Makes tons of money•Delights the userRole of Structured Methods•Creativity vs. Recipe in design•Creativity vs. Recipe in product development processPretty Good Pictures of the Disassembled gas pedal assembly: http://www.thetruthaboutcars.com/exclusive-ttac-takes-apart-both-toyota-gas-pedals/Reasonable overview of the Problem with pretty good pictures. http://www.thetruthaboutcars.com/why-toyota-must-replace-flawed-cts-gas-pedal-with-superior-denso-pedal/ Interface of interest.Comment on Design News Article about the Toyota Accelerator Issue:I don't believe that Engineering at Toyota was not aware of a problem or concerns in a Safety Critical system like a drive by wire accelerator. Proper Failure Mode Analysis was not done or the risk evaluated too