EPsy 8271 Reflection Paper – Week 4 Jihoon Ryoo 1 Gigerenzer, G. (1996) On Narrow Norms and Vague Heuristics: A Reply to Kahneman and Tverskty, Psychological Review, 103(3), 592-596 Gigerenzer answered what I have questions on Kahneman and Tversky’s (KT) work. For example, frequencies may not be good enough to support KT assertion. His writing looks like plausible to me as a naïve reader of KT work. Gigerenzer’s views on norms and heuristics are more realistic. Gigerenzer’s thought that Logics, for example probable and AND, behind KT works should be clarified is what I really wanted to hear. Statistical methodology of KT works does not seem to be reasonable or acceptable to statisticians. However, I don’t think KT aimed to show evidence to readers. KT, I think, classified “probable” cognitive process. Thus, in my point of view, KT and Gigerenzer seem to have a slightly different point of view. Of course, Gigerenzer’s pointing out the misusage of terminologies was clear. What KT wanted to say may not be fully captured by Gigerenzer. As we have discussed in “Conjunction fallacy and Base-Rate fallacy”, the logic as well as assertions are based on more like mathematics model (or terminology) than statistics point of view. I want to ask what kind of rephrases can be made in KT and Gigerenzer’s works. Shaughnessy, J. M. (1983) The Psychology of Inference and the Teaching of Probability and Statistics: Two Sides of the Same Coin? Decision Making Under Uncertainty (editor R.W. Schotz). From the first class, I had a question like “What happened in statistics education based on those fallacies?” Shaughnessy answered a lot. While reading KT papers, I felt that even thoughEPsy 8271 Reflection Paper – Week 4 Jihoon Ryoo 2 these papers dealt with statistical concepts, those concepts do not seem realistic but too abstract. Shaughnessy well set forth applying KT works to statistics education. The idea of exposure misconcepts, misusage, paradoxes, etc to students was great. Along the same line with this paper, I thought that KT’s questions may indicate fallacies but cannot evaluate students. All the remaining of KT’s indications depend on students. I should be more precise. KT’s quick, intuitive, time-limited question may not assess student’s ability but get ability of quickness or chance. I love Shaughnessy’s expression of “Think Aloud” and “Small Group Discussion”. As naïve reader on KT papers, I thought that the most powerful solution of overcoming fallacies is thinking the situation with time and liking data in statistics. A couple of parts look like out of date. For example, Green’s suggestion (2) and (3) could be suggestions but nowadays, statistics education is kind of independent study area separated from mathematics education. Overall, there are a couple of parts confusing between math education and stat education. However, the issues that Shaughnessy brought were interesting me. One of my questions is how exactly we implement issues related fallacies, simulations, and others that may help student understand correctly. I want to see what kinds of literature are dealing with those