Interrogations for Equality Seminar Session 2. Racial Inequality September 10, 2009 David Calnitsky Reading "'Ideal Theory' as Ideology," I found the distinction Mills makes between ideal-as-idealized-model and ideal-as-descriptive-model to be very close to the distinction often found in Marxist political economy and philosophy between mental generalizations/idealizations and real abstractions, respectively--though this is a debate I've always had difficulty with. So, as I understand it, if both neoclassical economics and Marxian political economy are in the business of building general theories to discover the structures beneath the mess of concrete reality, they are said to have different relationships to the concrete. Neoclassical economics is then accused of creating sets of ideal laws that operate when many concrete factors are assumed not to exist. By contrast, the search for real abstractions in the Marxian tradition, like the ideal-as-descriptive-model, is a search for those essential features of actually existing concrete factors (so to understand the general laws which regulate the capitalist system). I think this is what Marx is talking about in the methodological discussion in the Grundrisse, which implores social scientists/philosophers to move from the concrete to the abstract so to better understand the concrete (which then in the context of broader abstractions appears to be less chaotic). The problem for me with the ideal-as-descriptive-model (or real abstractions) is the seeming difficulty or impossibility in extracting what is "essential" from the concrete. Mills, on the ideal-as-descriptive-model says, "These are global, high level concepts, undeniable abstractions. But they map accurately (at least arguably) crucial realities … so while they abstract, they do not idealize” (p.175). But how do we know our ideal-as-descriptive-model is in fact “accurate”? If there are an infinite amount of characteristics attributable to any concrete factor, by what principle can we decide something or other is essential or inessential (ie, inexcludable or excludable)? There seems to be no principle here telling us how to build our ideal-as-descriptive-models. In that way, it’s hard for me to see why Mills’ examples of “white supremacy” and “patriarchy” (p.175) aren’t entirely arbitrary (something he wants to avoid). On a different topic, in Mills’ “Racial Liberalism,” he says “the repudiation of racial liberalism will thus require more than a confrontation with the historical record. It will also require an acknowledgement…that this record shows that the workings of such a polity are not to be grasped with the orthodox categories of raceless liberal democracy. Rather the conceptual innovation called for is a recognition of white supremacy as itself a political system…” Here, and elsewhere in the piece, I guess I think about liberalism differently from Mills. For me, if one says they hold liberal norms in the ideal sense, it does not mean that they believe in the just-so story of the social contract, nor does it mean that they do not recognize the actually existing history of institutional racism in, say, the US. Instead it means that they are specifically concerned with that actually existing racism and insist that the US is in fact not the liberal society some claim it to be (ie, they do not claim it is to be “grasped with the orthodox categories of raceless liberal democracy”), and finally that they wish for those ideal liberal norms to be realized. In that way the contrast Mills sets (p.1386) between the ideal theory of a fictitious universal liberalism and a nonideal theory expressing the reality of social hierarchy is not only not a contrast, but a directly complementary pair of ideas.Sociology 915/Philosophy 955 Interrogations, week 2 2 Catherine Willis Can an ideal theory of justice be written by those not in the social position of white males? In this weeks readings, the failure of liberal theory to help achieve better equality is explained by two main reasons: 1) the nature of ideal theory itself and 2) the authors of the theory. 1) The first conclusion that is drawn is that ideal theory in and of itself is the wrong tool because it asks what “justice demands in a perfectly just society” which is not where the US and many other countries currently are (Mills 2008 in PMLA, 1384). Furthermore, as a tool it can actually be detrimental, as it can mask the preexisting inequalities by assuming them away. This thus seems to write off the role of an ideal theory of justice all together. 2) The perseverance and popularity of liberalism as well as Rawls and others inability to push forward to address issues such as racism that are central to achieving justice in the US context is much related to the social position of these authors and the blinders that brings with them. It is for this reason that Mills calls ideal theory an ideology (Mills 2005 in Hypathia, 172). But if liberal theories are not necessarily wrong (Mills 2008 in PMLA, 1383), (although unhelpful as a tool) I ask first of all if and how they can they be useful. Furthermore, as the field and theorists of political philosophy become increasingly diversified, can liberal theory change or other ideal theories be written in a meaningful way (that makes it a more useful tool). This would require that ideal theory be written from a space which is not conceptually or demographically white; can an ideal theory of justice even be produced in this space? J. Edward Connery The significant difference and distance between ideal and non-ideal theory in philosophy appears as great as the difference between any two pairings of, for example, academic research and policy analysis. There have always been conflicts between those who pursue either an unachievable ideal or seemingly obscure and inconsequential “fact” and those who pursue concrete change (or protection of the status quo) in the actual lived experience of most human beings. The frustrations on either side are both real and valid as the constraints of one approach often represent a fundamental deficiency for the other. In his discussion of ideal verses non-ideal theory (specifically relating to justice vis-à-vis race) Charles Mills makes a compelling argument. By contrasting the ideal and just society found in the work of John Rawls with the historical, social, economic, and political realities of the