Chapter Three DESIGNING ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS FOR DISASTER MITIGATION AND RESPONSE: THE ROLE OF STRUCTURE Louise K. Comfort, Namkyung Oh, Gunes Ertan and Steve Scheinert Introduction The concept of resilience, defined here as the “capacity for collective action in the face of unexpected extreme events that shatter infrastructure and disrupt normal operating conditions,” is characterized by experienced researchers as involving the mental processes of sensemaking (Weick, 1995), improvisation (Mendonça, Beroggi and Wallace, 2001), innovation (Demchak, Chapter 4, this book), and problem solving (Comfort, 1994). Each of these processes involves the exercise of mental skills that depend upon keen observation and access to real-time information in changing conditions. Together, they represent the wider interpretation of resilience that is discussed earlier in Chapters One and Two. This chapter argues that a further process, cognition, is central to increasing resilience in the capacity of communities to manage recurring risk and to respond to, and recover from, disaster. Interpreting cognition in terms of its contribution to resilience, the main theme of this book, requires re-conceptualizing the relationship between perception and action and determining when in the sequence of an organization’s performance resilient behavior occurs and what factors contribute to its emergence in practice. Cognition in the context of disaster is defined as the capacity to recognize the degree of emerging risk to which a community is exposed and to act on that information. When risk is not 59recognized by those who are legally responsible for protecting communities and no action – or inadequate action – is taken, the situation can rapidly escalate into a threatening, imminent disaster. Retrospective analysis of the response to an actual disaster can provide insight into the role of cognition among responders to disaster operations With a clear focus on the role of cognition, we reframe the concept of intergovernmental crisis management as a complex, adaptive system. That is, the system adjusts and adapts its performance to fit the demands of an ever-changing physical, engineered, and social environment. The terms of cognition, communication, coordination, and control are redefined in ways that fit the reality of practice more accurately in extreme events (Comfort, 2007). In this process, a framework emerges for analysis. This conceptual framework is used to assess the performance of the intergovernmental system that evolved in response to the 2005 Hurricane Katrina and ensuing flood in New Orleans. The goal of this analysis is to determine more specifically the structure and processes within organizations and among jurisdictions that build resilience to extreme events. An effective intergovernmental crisis management system is a dynamic inter-organizational system characterized by a cumulative sequence of decisions that leads to a coherent response system. This sequence includes four subsets of decisions that define an evolving strategy of action: 1) detection of risk; 2) recognition and interpretation of risk for the immediate context; 3) communication of risk to multiple organizations in a wider region; and 4) self organization and mobilization of a collective, community response system to reduce risk and respond to danger. Each sub-set of decisions involves the search and exchange of information across organizations and jurisdictions that underscore the shared responsibility of decision makers in 60mobilizing a coherent response to the extreme event. With each decision, the responsible managers may choose to reduce, share, or ignore the risk. The cumulative record of decisions taken across organizations and jurisdictions represents the collective capacity of a region to manage the risks to which it is exposed. This capacity is documented by its reduction in loss and adjustment in allocation of resources and attention to create an effective balance between immediate demands and long-term goals. Resilience in practice means maintaining this balance between short-term needs and long-term goals of safety and security for the community. The tension between structure and process in organizing collective action represents a classic problem in organizational design and performance. This tension is especially critical in disaster environments, where the goal is to maintain continuity of operations in communities shattered by destructive events. Organizations and institutions provide structure, order, and predictability in stable communities. The difficulty occurs when the established order no longer fits the requirements for managing risk to the community. The challenge lies in maintaining a sufficient balance between structure, or clear rules for conducting the operations needed to protect a community, versus process, the urgent demands of the environment that may require novel approaches and flexible adaptation to support action. In this chapter, we first consider a set of propositions that contribute to resilience in disaster response. We examine these propositions in reference to the actual performance of the disaster response system following Hurricane Katrina, using the situation reports that were recorded by the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness. We analyze the performance of the response system in terms of the rate of response to requests for assistance, and review the conditions under which the system operated. Next, we identify a set of bottlenecks, or decision points in the process where action stalled in response operations 61following Katrina. Finally, we review the requirements for improving organizational learning in intergovernmental disaster response systems. Risk Assessment and Response in a Disaster Management Resilience differs from standard conceptions of emergency management. Emergency management has largely focused on local events. More difficult and less frequent, but far more devastating, are large, multi-jurisdictional regional events. Hurricane Katrina, for example, crossed the jurisdictional boundaries of multiple municipalities and counties in nine states, three federal regions, and international borders of Caribbean island nations, Mexico, and Canada.1 Managing disasters on such a scale exceeded the capacity of the Federal Response Plan and the National Incident Management Plan, the plan and procedures governing