The University of Texas at AustinStudies in Ethics, Safety, and Liability for EngineersKurt Hoover and Wallace T. FowlerSpace Shuttle ChallengerMission 51-L Launch DecisionBackgroundThe Space ShuttleNASA Planning and PoliticsFactors Affecting the Launch DecisionPressures to FlySystem Status and CompetitionPoliticsSequence of EventsMonday, January 27Tuesday, January 28Pre-Launch EventsThe LaunchPost-Crash EventsSafety and Ethics IssuesReferencesChallenger Launch Decision AssignmentsAssignment AAssignment BAssignment CAssignment DAssignment EThe University of Texas at Austin Studies in Ethics, Safety, and Liability for Engineers Kurt Hoover and Wallace T. Fowler Space Shuttle ChallengerMission 51-L Launch DecisionOn January 28, 1986, the Space Shuttle Challenger was launched for the last time. The decision to launch the Challenger was not simple. Certainly no one dreamed that the Shuttle would explode less than two minutes after lift-off. Much has been said and written about the decision to launch. Was the decision to launch correct? How was the decision made? Could anyone have foreseen the subsequent explosion? Should the decision-making procedure have been modified? These questions are examined in this case study. TABLE OF CONTENTS - Background - Factors Affecting the Launch Decision - Sequence of Events - Safety and Ethics Issues - References - Challenger Launch Decision Assignments BackgroundThe Space ShuttleThe Space Shuttle is the most complicated vehicle ever constructed. Its complexity dwarfs any previous project ever attempted, including the Apollo project. The Apollo project possessed a very specific goal--to send men to the moon--whereas the Space Shuttle program has a wide variety of goals, some of which conflict. The attempt to satisfy conflicting goals is one of the chief roots of difficulty with the design of the SpaceShuttle. Originally, the design was to be only a part of NASA's overall manned spacetransportation system, but because of politics and budget cuts, it was transformed from anintegral component of a system to the sole component of the manned space program.The Space Shuttle was the first attempt to produce a truly reusable spacecraft. All previous spacecraft were designed to fly only a single mission. In the late 1960's, NASA envisioned a vehicle which could be used repeatedly, thus reducing both the engineering cost and hardware costs. However, the resulting vehicle was not as envisioned. It had severe design flaws, one of which caused the loss of the Challenger. NASA Planning and PoliticsNASA's post-Apollo plans for the continued manned exploration of space rested on a three-legged triad. The first leg was a reusable space-transportation system, the Space Shuttle, which could transport men and cargo to low earth orbit (LEO) and then land backon Earth to prepare for another mission. The second leg was a manned orbiting space station that would be resupplied by the Shuttle and would serve as both a transfer point for activities further from Earth and as a scientific and manufacturing platform. The final leg was the exploration of Mars, which would start from the Space Station. Unfortunatelythe politics and inflation of the early 70's forced NASA to retreat from its ambitious program. Both the Space Station and the Journey to Mars were delayed indefinitely, and the United States manned space program was left standing on one leg--the Space Shuttle. Even worse, the Shuttle was constantly under attack by a Democratic Congress and poorly defended by a Republican president.To retain Shuttle funding, NASA was forced to make a series of major concessions. First, facing a highly constrained budget, NASA sacrificed the research and development necessary to produce a truly reusable shuttle and instead accepted a design that was only partially reusable, eliminating one of the features that made the shuttle attractive in the first place. Solid rocket boosters (SRBs) were used instead of safer liquid fueled boosters because they required a much smaller research-and-development effort. Numerous other design changes were made to reduce the level of research and development required.Second, to increase its political clout and to guarantee a steady customer base, NASA enlisted the support of the United States Air Force. The Air Force could provide the considerable political clout of the Defense Department and had many satellites which required launching. However, Air Force support did not come without a price. The Shuttle payload bay was required to meet Air Force size and shape requirements, which placed key constraints on the ultimate design. Even more important was the Air Force requirement that the Shuttle be able to launch from Vandenburg Air Force Base in California. This constraint required a larger cross range than the Florida site, which in turn decreased the total allowable vehicle weight. The weight reduction required the elimination of the design's air-breathing engines, resulting in a single-pass unpowered landing that greatly limited the safety and landing versatility of the vehicle.Factors Affecting the Launch Decision Pressures to FlyAs the year 1986 began, there was extreme pressure on NASA to "Fly out the Manifest" From its inception the Space Shuttle program had been plagued by exaggerated expectations, funding inconsistencies, and political pressures. The ultimate design was shaped almost as much by politics as physics. President Kennedy's declaration that the United States would land a man on the moon before the end of the decade had provided NASA's Apollo program with high visibility, a clear direction, and powerful political backing. The Space Shuttle program was not as fortunate; it had neither a clear direction nor consistent political backing. System Status and CompetitionIn spite of all its early difficulties, the Shuttle program looked quite good in 1985. A total of 19 flights had been launched and recovered, and although many had experienced minor problems, all but one of the flights could rightfully be categorized as successful. However, delays in the program as a whole had lead the Air Force to request funds to develop an expendable launch vehicle. Worse still, the French launch organization Arianespace had developed an independent capability to place satellites into orbit at prices the Shuttle could not hope to match without greatly increased federal subsidization(which was not likely to occur as Congress was becoming increasingly