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Berkeley ESPM 169 - Compliance, Implementation and Effectiveness

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ESPM 169: Compliance, Implementation and EffectivenessSeptember 25, 2003 How well do international agreements work, and how can we tell? current UN/US debate over multilateralism and its effectivenessParticular Issue: environmental regimes are Regulatory Agreements – signatory states have to get private actors to change behavior - cf. some other sorts of agreements that just involve adjustments of state behavior – e.g. lifting tariffs or changing weapons policies1. Different Levels of Effectiveness: separate but linked problemsa. after signature: ratification by legislature and implementation into national law - i.e. a law or an amendment to existing law is passed – such as the Clean Air Act or a Wildlife Preservation Act which contains the terms of the agreement, goals to be achieved, and penalties meted out if no compliance - then up to private actors to comply, government agencies to advise and enforceb. compliance: the extent to which states actually stick by the terms of the agreement - need for monitoringc. effectiveness: i. that the agreement does what’s intendedii. that private actors’ behavior is changediii. that the agreement makes a positive difference in the environmental problemiv. that it’s efficient and equitable note these are the “ideal” criteria, very hard to reach2. Measurement Issuesa. Data on environmental changes not in yet – takes years to affect the ozone hole, for instanceBUT: models can predict differencesb. Problems of exogenous effects - e.g. FSU and ECE and ozone - need for counterfactuals c. Regime implementation is a long-term commitment and compliance can go up and downd. So few regimes are actually implemented yet has tended to lead to a focus on compliance - but this is problematic – as it leaves open the issue of stringency of regimes, for instance, or regimes that re-affirm status quo 4. What are the determinants of effectiveness? - decision cf. structural variables - malleable cf. fixedFrom Weiss and Jacobson:1. Characteristics of Activity targeted by the agreement - complex cf. simple2. Characteristics of Accord - regime design matters - Ron M. - intentional oil pollution at sea2- organizational effectiveness literature - decision rules, enforcement, funds, revenue sources, flexibility3. International Environment: political agenda and awareness; leader states; international financial institutions and markets4. Factors Involving the Country note malleable variables cf. causal variables (and parameters) - things we can change!5. Barriers to Effectiveness as some authors have put it, we enter international environmental negotiations – all of us, in fact – with a mixture of hope and skepticism non-compliance with international law is relatively rare: however it’s also rare that states are being asked to do so much and give up sovereigntya. Collective Action Problemsb. Monitoring and Enforcementc. State Capacity - i.e. the ability a government has to change the behavior of its citizens - note centrality of states here - capacity has many dimensions: willingness and ability to change - resources: financial - resources: personnel and expertise - regulatory strength (sort of related)Example: Britain and HWT ban cf. an LDC and illegal waste dumping3d. The extent to which environmental issues are embedded in broader socio-economic issues – cuts across many sectors of society and economye. Unintended Effects Clapp: illegal imports of CFCs into industrialized countries (US, Taiwan, Canada, Australia) – second only to illegal drug trade in ports such as Miami – perhaps 20% of CFCs in current globaluse bought on black market - LDCs can supply; firms in DCs who don’t want to switch to more expensive equipment are the demand - differentiated phase-out dates; inability to meet phase-out dates - CFCs perfect for smuggling - being addressed in Montreal framework, but very hard – not set up to deal with this issue - similar problems with wastes and wildlife: goes underground, lucrative niche markets - question: is this just temporary? Something we can live with for the moment? Or should we change phaseout dates?Peluso: oppressive states use international commitments as an excuse to use violent means of repression against “troublesome groups” – e.g. “poachers” in Kenya, forest dwellers in Indonesia - more generally, states use agreements to re-define resources and ownership to their ownadvantage; can facilitate a state’s control over civil society - state can use financial aid from environmental organizations for this purpose - very real problem: that international agreements can be used by states to legitimize their actions - highlights that IEAs usually silent on the means used, and the equity of those means, to implement the terms of the agreement.4- also highlights the need for regime creators and supporters to think very carefully abouthow to implement “think global, act local” in these cases6. The CBD Ten Years On - how well is it doing? - Framework Convention - not a set of detailed obligations - still: report card mixed more species endangered; details around technology transfer still to be worked out; progress very slowHowever:a. many signatories have created national BD strategy and action plans - more than 100; has provided an important framework for development of national policies, especially for countries who don't have them - education and awarenessb. international coordination improved among UNEP and CBD secretariat etc.c. GEF has functioned pretty well; was strengthened and refinanced increased involvement of NGOs and other stakeholder groupsd. regime strengthening - Biosafety Protocol has entered into forcee. Access and benefit sharing agreements being developed - bioprospecting challenges: WTO, climate change, invasive species7. Finally, are we doing too little, too late?? Some More Positive Indicators5 Despite these barriers, some studies point towards growing trends to comply with and/or implement international environmental agreements many authors also talk about the strengthened role of non-state actors and experts in enhancing compliance and building an international community concerned with environmental issues - Litfin piece: she argues that the transnational community being built up now might in tern form the foundation for stronger regimes in the future (global civil society argument) - empowering different sorts of


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