FINAL REPORT TONATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCHTITLE: CAN GORBACHEV'S REFORMS SUCCEEDAUTHOR: George W. BreslauerUniversity of California, BerkeleyCONTRACTOR: National Council for Soviet and East European ResearchPRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: V. I. ToumanoffCOUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER: 1724-120189DATE: December, 1988The work lead ing to this report was supported by funds provided bythe National Council for Soviet and East European Research. Theanalysis and interpretations contained in the report are those ofthe author .Can Gorbachev's Reforms Succeed?George W. BreslauerDepartment of Political ScienceUniversity of California at BerkeleyCan Gorbachev's radical reforms succeed? It is striking to note howdifferent the discussion of this topic would have been only 7-10 years ago.At that time, most academic discussion was dominated by skepticism ofradical or reactionary images of the future. The emphasis was rather on theways in which Soviet leaders might "muddle through," rationalize the commandeconomy, or foster "moderate reform." [Ruble 1981; Bialer 1980; Colton 1984;Breslauer 1978]. The prevailing assumption (which I shared) was that theSoviet, or at least the Russian, population was exceptionally passive andpatient, that the regime needed only to deliver incremental improvements inthe standard of living to maintain political peace, and that moderatereforms would make that possible. We also overwhelmingly assumed that,should a reformist leadership come to power and seek to anticipate orpreempt crisis, it would push for economic reform, but not far-reachingpolitical liberalization, much less democratization.These assumptions and projections were based upon a relativelyundifferentiated image of the Soviet population's political aspirations, anda view of the political establishment that posited little likelihood of highpolarization between conservatives and reformists. We accepted the StephenCohen [1985] argument that these tendencies existed, but assumed that atechnocratic synthesis of the two would dominate the middle ranges of thepolitical spectrum, making moderate reform politically feasible and the most2attractive alternative. Then too, we tended to underestimate the depth ofantagonism and the bravery among ethnic minorities.The SIP studies, which have only begun to appear in the last three tofour years [Millar 1987], implicitly warned us that our images were out-of-date. They presented hard data that demonstrated a real generation gap onmatters of both economic and political reform. Those data told us to employa more differentiated image of both society and polity, and alerted us tothe existence of an extensive social base for reform-as well as to a setof social strata that did not have a large stake in reform.It would be too harsh to claim that Gorbachev has proven us wrong. Wedo not know what would have happened had a moderate reformer come to powerinstead of Gorbachev for example, if Andropov had lived on, in goodhealth, for ten years. Even in the absence of a lengthy tenure forAndropov, there was nothing inevitable about Gorbachev's coming to power.And there was nothing inevitable about his political radicalization during1986-88. It was Gorbachev who, for good political reasons that I cannotexplore in this paper, unleashed social forces with his glasnost andperestroika campaigns. He encouraged radicalization and people took him upon it, then facing him with a snowball effect that he could not control.Since people everywhere often "rebel" only when they perceive it to be afeasible, not just desirable, alternative, it is quite possible that, had amoderate reformer come to power, we would not be witnessing the extent ofsocial turmoil we find today in the USSR. The antagonisms and alienationwould have been there, but people might have been less likely to act uponthem.Be that as it may, Gorbachev and we face a new reality. The genie isout of the bottle, and it can only be put back in at great cost. Hence,today we debate grander choices. Now that the level of autonomous socialand political mobilization is so great, it is at least questionable whether"muddling through" could ever again be a viable alternative to abreakthrough to the left or to the right.Before we discuss whether Gorbachev's reforms can succeed, let us beclear as to what we mean by reform. I do not mean a multi-party liberaldemocracy and a free-market economy, though these are scenarios that must beconsidered when we discuss alternative futures (see below). Rather, I meana process of democratization of political relationships, liberalization ofexpression, and partial marketization of the economy. Reform means aprocess of maintaining a secular momentum in each of these directions.Conservatism means an effort to slow, stop, or reverse that momentum.Reaction is an effort to turn back the clock to a more authoritarian,centralized, and coercive regime than existed even under Brezhnev. It seemsobvious that neither we nor Gorbachev know how far a Soviet leader will haveto go, or will be allowed to go, in order to create a more viable politicaland economic order.Which raises the question of what constitutes "success." This is alsoa murky issue that is best dealt with without over-specification.Politically, it means that new mechanisms and processes of conflict-management have been created and at least moderately institutionalized thatincrease the accountability of officials to their constituencies.Economically, it means that structural reforms, after a difficulttransition, during which the situation is likely to worsen, survive backlash4temptations and generate sustained improvements in both growth andconsumption. In this respect, comparative referents are useful. China andHungary would be the examples of economic success, though inflation ratesand foreign indebtedness raise questions about how to emulate them whileavoiding these outcomes, while Poland and Yugoslavia would represent theoutcomes to avoid.One could, of course, make this easier on the forecaster by adoptingmore modest definitions of success. (Surely Gorbachev will be tempted toadjust downward the definition of success to maintain the legitimacy of hisleadership, should the process of reform stall for long, but that is anothermatter.) Political success could be defined as the avoidance of systemicbreakdown and civil war. Economic success could be defined as the avoidanceof economic unraveling. This is a set of definitions that Poland's