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PSU CSE 543 - The Protection of Information in Computer Systems

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The Protection of Information in Computer SystemsThe Protection of Information in Computer SystemsJerome H. Saltzer and Michael D. SchroederPresented by Kang-Hsien Chou and Sharanya EswaranJerome H. Saltzer and Michael D. SchroederPresented by Kang-Hsien Chou and Sharanya EswaranOutlineOutline Separation of address and protection Capability system and access control list system Protected subsystem Role based access control (other mechanism) Research directions Separation of address and protection Capability system and access control list system Protected subsystem Role based access control (other mechanism) Research directionsDescriptor-based systemDescriptor-based system Capability system and access control list system Early feature is to prevent from writing in other users’ allocated memory. (IBM System 360) “fetch protect” was than considered (IBM System/370) The scheme is supported by many OS including Honeywell, Hydra, StarOS … Capability system and access control list system Early feature is to prevent from writing in other users’ allocated memory. (IBM System 360) “fetch protect” was than considered (IBM System/370) The scheme is supported by many OS including Honeywell, Hydra, StarOS …Separation of Address and ProtectionSeparation of Address and Protection All memory accesses need to go through two level of descriptor. Each segment must be a distinct addressing descriptor. A unique segment identifier An offset address The protection descriptor itself no longer contains a base and bound. All memory accesses need to go through two level of descriptor. Each segment must be a distinct addressing descriptor. A unique segment identifier An offset address The protection descriptor itself no longer contains a base and bound.Capability systemCapability system Who can load values into the protection descriptor registers? Privileged state bit To allow any program to load the protection descriptor registers, but only from locations in memory that previously have been certified to contain acceptable protection descriptor value.  Two kinds of objects stored in the memory. Protection descriptor values Ordinary data value Tagged bit Who can load values into the protection descriptor registers? Privileged state bit To allow any program to load the protection descriptor registers, but only from locations in memory that previously have been certified to contain acceptable protection descriptor value.  Two kinds of objects stored in the memory. Protection descriptor values Ordinary data value Tagged bitAccess control list systemAccess control list system Storage area for data and access controller Address descriptor for the associate segment Access control list Authorization check When a virtual processor attempts to refer to the segment associated with the access controller, the memory system looks up the principal identifier in the access control list. Storage area for data and access controller Address descriptor for the associate segment Access control list Authorization check When a virtual processor attempts to refer to the segment associated with the access controller, the memory system looks up the principal identifier in the access control list.Protected subsystemProtected subsystem Why protected subsystem? Only those access restrictions provided by the standard system facilities can be enforced. Execution of a borrowed program in the borrower’s domain can present a real danger to the borrower. A protected subsystem is a collection of program and data segment that is “encapsulated” Care taker program Why protected subsystem? Only those access restrictions provided by the standard system facilities can be enforced. Execution of a borrowed program in the borrower’s domain can present a real danger to the borrower. A protected subsystem is a collection of program and data segment that is “encapsulated” Care taker programRole based access controlRole based access control Role based access control is formalized in 1992 by David Ferraioloand Rick Kuhn. Why RBAC?DAC allows users to grant or revoke access to any of the objects under their control.However, if the end uses do not “own” the information for which they are allowed access? RBAC is a nondiscretionary access control mechanism which allowsand prompts the central administration of an organization specific security policy. Provide means to Naming, as well as relationships between individuals and rights The user can not pass access permissions on to others at their discretion. Role based access control is formalized in 1992 by David Ferraioloand Rick Kuhn. Why RBAC?DAC allows users to grant or revoke access to any of the objects under their control.However, if the end uses do not “own” the information for which they are allowed access? RBAC is a nondiscretionary access control mechanism which allowsand prompts the central administration of an organization specific security policy. Provide means to Naming, as well as relationships between individuals and rights The user can not pass access permissions on to others at their discretion.Research directionsResearch directions Certification of the correctness of protection system designs and implementations A precise model (complete isolation?, sharing of information?) Verify if the presented implementation actually does what it claims. Friendly user interface System software runs without protection constraints Invulnerability of protection system design Undetected disabling of the protection mechanism Constraints on use of information after release Certification of the correctness of protection system designs and implementations A precise model (complete isolation?, sharing of information?) Verify if the presented implementation actually does what it claims. Friendly user interface System software runs without protection constraints Invulnerability of protection system design Undetected disabling of the protection mechanism Constraints on use of information after releaseResearch directions (cont’d)Research directions (cont’d) Encipherment of information with secret key how to communicate the keys to authorized users Schemes for protecting the keys Development of


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PSU CSE 543 - The Protection of Information in Computer Systems

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