Introduction Quantum computers are already being produced I d like to say we re back in 1947 at the time transistors were invented David DiVincenzo Reputed to have great power it is important to understand how they will affect current practice in Information Security Quantum Computing Quantum Computers were first suggested as a better way of modeling physical systems Utilizes Heisenberg Uncertainty principle Cannot know state without measurement Cannot measure without changing state State of a particle may vary along a continuum Can determine likelihood of being in a certain region The Qubit Conventional bits hold flat binary data 0 or 1 Quantum Bits Qubits hold probabilities of values superposition Like simultaneously holding 0 and 1 Measurement changes the Qubit state It can only actually encode one value Even copying is impossible Logical gates still exist but must be reversible Power of Quantum Computing Power of Quantum Parallelism A single operation applies to all superpositions at once All possible results of an operation are retrieved Example Shor s Algorithm quantum computing algorithm to actually factor large numbers in polynomial time Quantum Cryptography More accurately called Quantum Key Distribution QKD Qubits are encoded into properties of a photon Attackers don t know which property Can t read information without destroying Qubit Selected bases shared afterwards Only sender and receiver can interpret Confidentiality Public key system is susceptible to algorithmic and technological advances Quantum computers can factor quickly QKD is theoretically Unconditionally Secure Dissent exists over practicality of this result but benefits still appear Authentication Public key provides inherent authentication of users and data QKD lacks its own authentication scheme uses existing authentication like public key quantum authentication in development but has a long way to go In event of public key collapse systems using public keys gain nothing from QKD Current Cost Benefits Public key QKD Inexpensive High Price Software driven Hardware driven Dynamic participants Framework requires mostly static participants QKD does not appear a viable solution for common needs Good for large institutions with high risk static communication lines Theoretical Impact Dispute over QKD benefits lies in possible failure of public key systems leaves QKD as only option for fast dynamic keys QKD requires an authenticated channel which then requires public key or existing symmetric keys QKD can only be part of a larger framework Authentication systems orthogonal to current infeasibility barriers are needed Current Impact Been claimed that QKD evades Man in theMiddle Not true although it does complicate it For most purposes public key provides only practical solution QKD provides benefit against large high risks Only currently vulnerable when public key is broken before or during transmission provides a means of transferring that if successful is immune to cryptanalytic advances Quantum Error Correction QEC Quantum Equivalent of Error Correcting Codes ECC for classical computers Needed because of decoherence interactions with an environment can cause a quantum system to collapse into a different state Simplest methods work under the same principle as ECC Quantum Storage to Protect Classical Systems Quantum states can be used to store classical information Quantum storage systems could protect information from classical malware attacks it cannot change the quantum state Quantum Malware Malware malicious software Malware examples Viruses Worms Trojan programs Malware can exist for quantum systems Based on our experiences with classical systems it will happen once quantum systems become more standard Protecting Quantum Systems The issue of protecting Quantum systems from malware has not been addressed in research until this year More research is needed to ensure quantum systems offer at least basic protections One protocol to protect quantum storage systems Wu and Lidar 2005 Wu and Lidar s Protocol Mostly a network protocol Assumptions There is some time available that the network is inactive All computers on the network have a preset time schedule for connecting disconnecting from the network secret unknown to outsiders Each computer has a register available to the move contents of main memory to not copy because of the no cloning theorem The register is completely separated and thus inaccessible from the network Protocol Steps 1 System Offline 2 System Online data exchanged processed 3 System Offline memory moved to register backup 4 System Online if attacked only garbage information available in main memory real information is in backup 5 System Offline backup moved to memory for operations communication Overall Impacts Quantum Computers necessitate much more intricate future work Public key systems could fall Fragility in computational devices allows much more subtle subterfuge QKD provides some benefit but most benefits remain theoretical Historical data safer for large static groups Lacks dynamic nature if public key fails Future Work Quantum Computers face the problem of malware Stronger protocols need to be developed to protect them QKD still requires the use of protocols it was meant to replace Quantum secure authentication schemes must replace the current public key system