Unformatted text preview:

The Act of Choice RICHARD HOLTON ASPECTS OF FREE WILL Nietzsche: the will “is a unit only as a word”. (Beyond Good and Evil §19) Some different dimensions: moral responsibility; theological aspects; agency; the phenomenology of freedom. Johnson: “Sir we know our will is free, and there’s an end on’t”. “You are surer that you can lift up your finger or not as you please than you are of any conclusion from a deduction of reasoning.” “All theory is against the freedom of the will; all experience for it”. (All quotations from Boswell’s Life. Compare Locke: “I cannot have a clearer perception of any thing than that I am free”, letter to Molyneux 1693) What is the nature of the experience? PHENOMENOLOGY OF FREEDOM Even here, there are many aspects: phenomenology of agency; phenomenology of deliberation; phenomenology of choice. The latter is an experience of an act of choice or decision (i.e. a decision to, not a decision that). Libertarianism misses this point, as noted, for instance, by Anthony Collins who objects to those who appeal to vulgar experience to support libertarian views, ‘yet, inconsistently therewith, contradict the vulgar experience, by owning it to be an intricate matter, and treating it after an intricate matter’. (An Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty, Second Edition 1717, p. 30) The central contention here: there is such an activity as making a choice; and this is significant because choice has two important features: The necessity of choice for action. Typically, in order to move to action, we need to make a choice about what to do. The beliefs and desires that we have are not, on their own, enough to move us; moreover they are not enough to cause our choices. Thus neither our actions nor our choices are determined by our prior beliefs and desires. The sufficiency of choice for action. Typically, having made the choice we will now act: given the right context, the choice is effective in taking us to action. Both of these features are features that we can plausibly, but defeasibly, be aware of in experience. (Compare our awareness of the truth of other mundane causal claims.) Theyare, however, not incompatible with determinism. They are only incompatible with a particular way in which our actions might be determined, i.e. via beliefs and desires. (Don’t be mislead by the names into thinking that I’m giving necessary and sufficient conditions for choice!) Challenges to necessity: automatic actions (habitual; instinctive). Distinguish local and global challenges. Challenges to sufficiency: automatic actions overruling choice; choice as epiphenomenon. Again distinguish local and global challenges. STANDARD COMPATIBILIST ACCTOUNTS Standard compatibilist accounts typically don’t make space for an act of choice; and it is hard to see how they could make sense of it if they wanted to. Desire based accounts The objects, means, &c are the weights, the man is the scale, the understanding of a convenience or inconvenience is the pressure of those weights, which incline him now one way, now another; and that inclination is the will.(Hobbes, Collected English Works Vol. V p. 326.) Belief (or reason) based accounts (i) deliberation: considering the options that are available, and their likely consequences; getting clear on one’s own desires, and one’s own prior plans and intentions; seeing how the options fit in with these desires and plans; establishing pros and cons. (ii) deciding that: making a judgment that a certain action is best, given the considerations raised in the process of deliberation. The upshot of the judgment is a belief. (iii) deciding to: deciding to do the action that one judged was best. The upshot of this decision is an intention (iv) acting: acting on the intention that has been made, which involves both doing that thing, and coordinating other actions and intentions around it. On the internalist account, (iii) collapses into (ii); but then there no real place for choice. On the externalist account the two remain distinct, but then choice becomes a liability. — 2 —EXPLAINING THE NEED FOR CHOICE (1) Theological considerations: the need for a test etc. Hopeless without God, tricky with him. (2) Indifference and incommensurability. Yes, but there is a risk that it makes choosing look like picking. (3) The use of resolutions in resisting temptation. Shows why beliefs aren’t enough; and gives empirical reason for thinking that prior mental states aren’t sufficient (we need to factor in abilities, effort etc); but gives little basis for the utility of choice. Why not automatically form the intention on the basis of one’s belief, formed away from the temptation, about what is best? (4) Acting on limited information. Maximizing is very difficult and so very cognitively expensive; we are typically unable to do it. So we do not arrive at stage (ii). Situations of perceived incommensurability can be understood as involving an inability to rank, not necessarily as involving the (philosophically tendentious) conviction that there is no ranking available. We are very frequently in the position that several options look good, and that whilst we think that one might be the best, we are unable to form a judgment, in the time available, about which one it is. If we have little idea about how to go about ranking them, that is a situation that we would think of as possibly involving incommensurability; if we know how to rank but lack the time to do so, that is simple lack of information. Both of these are situations in which the ability to choose is needed. But choosing here does not amount to mere picking. The agent deliberates in deciding what to do; it is just that this deliberation does not involve arriving at judgments as to what is best. (More on what this deliberation amounts to later.) THREE OBJECTIONS (i) If you can’t get an objective ranking, go for a subjective ranking. Response: this misunderstands the force of the worry: it is exactly the subjective ranking that is unavailable. (ii) On satisficing accounts, the action is determined by the belief that a certain outcome is good enough.


View Full Document

MIT 24 221 - The Act of Choice

Download The Act of Choice
Our administrator received your request to download this document. We will send you the file to your email shortly.
Loading Unlocking...
Login

Join to view The Act of Choice and access 3M+ class-specific study document.

or
We will never post anything without your permission.
Don't have an account?
Sign Up

Join to view The Act of Choice 2 2 and access 3M+ class-specific study document.

or

By creating an account you agree to our Privacy Policy and Terms Of Use

Already a member?