Propheter 1 Lori PropheterDr. StricklandEnglish 401Final PaperDec. 13, 2002Essentialism in Feminism A charge of essentialism against a feminist writer is a critique found frequently in feminist writing, but the concept of essentialism itself is rarely explicitly defined. Basically, the term essentialism (and its cognates which will be discussed later) refers to the attribution of fixed, inherent qualities to women. Essentialism is a serious issue in feminist studies, and has inspired much debate over some of the basic tenets of feminism. This divide over essentialism’ s validity and importance is vital in understanding the distinctions between second and third wave feminism and the debate between feminisms of equality and feminisms of difference. When the concept of essentialism and its place in the history of feminism is examined, some of the major trends of this history become visible, and some of the latest thinking about the direction of contemporary feminist theory is illuminated. In her essay “Sexual Difference and the Problem of Essentialism,” scholar Elizabeth Grosz gives clear definitions of essentialism and its cognates. As noted earlier, essentialism refers to the attribution of a fixed essence to women. This essence is thought of as a given universal for all women and can relate to different sets of qualities, such as biological or psychological characteristics. The form of essentialism where women’ s inherent essence is associated with her bodily characteristics is referred to as biologism. In this line of thought, women are typically reduced to their nuturative and reproductive capabilities. Biologism alsoPropheter 2confirms general stereotypes about women; for example, that women are physically weaker than men, or that they are more emotional than men. Grosz notes the restrictive features of this particular form of essentialism when she states “ [i]nsofar as biology is assumed to constitute an unalterable bedrock of identity, the attribution of biologistic characteristics amounts to a permanent form of social containment for women” (“Sexual Difference”).Naturalism is another kind of essentialism. This form differs from biologism is that it may be defended on religious rather than biological grounds. Women’s essence could be seen as conforming to God-given qualities that are not fully understandable in solely biological terms. Universalism is a form of essentialism that differs from biologism and naturalism, because it is not concerned with intrinsic, preset characteristics. Universalism “tends to suggest only the commonness of all women at all times and in all social contexts” (Grosz). It is a kind of essentialism that is conceived of in social terms, and that is concerned with social categories, activities, or functions that all wome n share, evoking such concepts as the gendered division of labor or the incest taboo. Often using these terms as synonyms for the others, feminists in the later second wave began to accuse their predecessors of being essentialist in their writing in some way. This reflected a changing atmosphere in feminist studies— a more fragmented and socially aware atmosphere. To understand this shift, it necessary to examine the context from which the second wave arose.The second wave of feminism was born when females that were involved in radical political or social reform movements in the 60s began to notice that they were second-class citizens in these organizations, and began to understand that even more important than the civil rights issues they were demonstrating for was the fact that they were dominated and repressed because they were female. Imelda Whelehan states that “ [l]eft-wing analyses of social injusticePropheter 3focused on class as the central determinant of power relations, assuming that male and female experiences were identical…” (4). The kind of feminism that developed out of such a context, where women were just beginning to realize their repression as women, was almost necessarily going to be somewhat essentialist, focused on the broadest category possible— the female— without considerations for whether that female was black or white, rich or poor. Whelehan writesthat “the primary site of struggle” in early second wave protests, initially against beauty pageants, “…was the female body itself, and the restrain ts imposed upon it by contemporary Western notions of femininity” (6). The concern here is with the female body in general, not the Hispanic female body, or the lower-class female body.Kate Millet’s Sexual Politics is often regarded as a vital early feminist text. One can witness this kind of generalized rhetoric that could be seen as essentialist: One must acknowledge that the chivalrous stance is a game the master group plays in elevating its subject to pedestal level…. As the sociologist Hugo Beigel has observed, both the courtly and the romantic versions of love are ‘grants’ which the male concedes out of his total power. Both have had the effect of obscuring the patriarchal character of Western culture and in their general tendency to attribute impossi ble virtues to women, having ended by confining them in a narrow and often remarkably conscribing sphere of behavior. (qtd. in Moi 65)Though an effective and intriguing critique of a patriarchic structure, Millet’ s argument reflects a generalized view that could be construed as essentialist. Her language is very general (“the patriarchal character of Western culture,” “ attribute impossible virtues to women,” “remarkably conscribing sphere of behavior”). Surely the degree of severity of repression suffered from thePropheter 4patriarchal character of Western culture depends on what race one is, if one is Native American or African American or white. And the degree of repression felt by a remarkably conscribing sphere of behavior would have to fluctuate depending on whether one is straight, lesbian, or bisexual. These are just the kind of criticisms leveled at many early second wave writers. Whelehan notes that the focus of early second wave feminism has always been to addressan audience that is “white, middle-class, heterosexual—[and] ignor[es] women who do not inhabit what is a relatively privileged social position” (41). This avoidance of issues connected with women of different classes, races, and sexual preferences became a major issue in the 80s, when the second wave saw