AA9.VERSTEEG.PRINT.DOC 4/4/2005 3:27 PM 571 LAW AND JUSTICE IN CAESAR’S GALLIC WARS Russ VerSteeg* INTRODUCTION Historians have written so much about Julius Caesar that it may strike one as presumptuous to propose to add anything of value that is novel today. The present study has a rather limited scope. My method has been to focus on Caesar’s own writing. In particular, using Caesar’s monograph on the Gallic Wars, De Bello Gallico, as a basis, this article attempts to gain some insight into his thinking about law.1 We know that Caesar had a great deal of practical experience in law. He studied law, pled a number of cases in the Roman law courts, and held several positions that required him to apply legal principles.2 In addition, legal questions significantly affected Caesar’s political life and his most important political decisions. In fact, in some respects, legal questions dominated much of what he did in his life.3 Thus, it is clear that he was well aware of the principles of practice, procedure, and * Professor, New England School of Law, Boston, Massachusetts; A.B. (Latin & Education) University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Phi Beta Kappa 1979); J.D. University of Connecticut School of Law (Magna Cum Laude 1987). Sincere thanks to Dean John F. O’Brien, Dean of New England School of Law and the Board of Trustees who provided funding for this Article with an Honorable James R. Lawton Summer Research Stipend. 1. Since Caesar did not write the last book of De Bello Gallico, I have omitted that text from my study. See GAIUS SUETONIUS TRANQUILLUS, Julius Caesar, in THE TWELVE CAESARS, § 56 at 34 (Robert Graves trans., 1975) (“Hirtius, who finished ‘The Gallic War’, left incomplete by Caesar, add[ed] a final book.”). In order to keep this project manageable, it was necessary to limit the scope of historical research. Therefore, for biographical information about Caesar, this Article relies primarily on four biographies, two ancient and two modern: GAIUS SUETONIUS TRANQUILLUS, Julius Caesar, in THE TWELVE CAESARS, 9-49 (Robert Graves trans., 1975) [hereinafter “SUETONIUS”]; PLUTARCH, Caesar, in FALL OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC: SIX LIVES BY PLUTARCH, 243-310 (Rex Warner trans., 1976) [hereinafter “PLUTARCH”]; CHRISTIAN MEIER, CAESAR: A BIOGRAPHY (David McLintock trans., 1995) [hereinafter “MEIER”]; and, MATTHIAS GELZER, CAESAR: POLITICIAN AND STATESMAN (Peter Needham trans., 1968) [hereinafter “GELZER”]. 2. See infra part I.A. 3. See infra part I.B.AA9.VERSTEEG.PRINT.DOC 4/4/2005 3:27 PM 572 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:571 substantive Roman law operative in the late Roman Republic. In order to provide background and context, Part I describes these two important aspects of the manner in which law affected Caesar’s life: namely, his own legal training and experience, and the legal issues that affected his most important decisions. Drawing on the text of De Bello Gallico, Part II considers Caesar’s thoughts regarding law in the abstract. Historians have acknowledged that the text of De Bello Gallico provides a lens through which we may perceive some of Caesar’s thoughts. For example, in discussing De Bello Gallico, Christian Meier remarks: “Though ostensibly a campaign report, it is also a highly idiosyncratic expression of the author’s personality.”4 According to Meier, “This book . . . is of the greatest interest as Caesar’s portrayal of himself.”5 Part II identifies two types of issues in an effort to uncover what Caesar thought about law and its role in society. The first type of issue that it addresses appears in his descriptions of “foreign laws” (i.e., non-Roman laws). At several points, Caesar digresses to mention, and occasionally to discuss, laws and legal features of the Gauls, Germans, and Britons. By considering these texts, we may be able to deduce something about what Caesar thought about justice. Second, Part II also looks at isolated statements he makes which, in some fashion, relate to justice, fairness, obligations, and punishments. An evaluation of these statements also adds to our understanding of Caesar’s conceptualization of jurisprudence. The goal of this study is not to try to use Caesar’s writing to uncover substantive rules or legal doctrine.6 Rather, the goal is to examine Caesar’s own words and to “read between the lines,” as it were, in an attempt to draw conclusions about what he thought about law on a more abstract level. What does Caesar perceive to be the role of law in society? How does he define justice? 4. MEIER, supra note 1, at 254; see also id. at 255-56 (“What really interests us is Caesar’s way of describing events and conditions and at the same time presenting himself.”). 5. Id. at 253; see also id. at 311 (“[H]e did not record his feelings. . . . He was inclined to be reticent and unforthcoming about his motives.”). 6. Presumably, given the wealth of legal references in his writing, it would be possible to undertake such a task. See infra note 119 for a more detailed explanation regarding Caesar’s references to law in De Bello Gallico.AA9.VERSTEEG.PRINT.DOC 4/4/2005 3:27 PM 2004] CAESAR’S GALLIC WARS 573 I. BACKGROUND & CONTEXT A. Caesar’s Practical Experience As a youth, Caesar was tutored by a freedman, “Marcus Antonius Gnipho, who had himself been educated in Alexandria and was a master of both Greek and Latin rhetoric.”7 In 77 B.C., at the age of twenty-three, he prosecuted Cornelius Dolabella for extortion, and in doing so, established himself as an exceptional advocate.8 In the very next year, he brought a similar action against “Gaius Antonius, who as legatus in the Mithradatic War had shamelessly plundered Greece.”9 Then, in 75 B.C., Caesar journeyed to the island of Rhodes to study rhetoric under Apollonius Molon.10 In 73 B.C., Caesar was elected Pontifex Maximus, a position that he continued to hold throughout his life. As pontifex, his responsibilities included dealing with a variety of legal issues. According to Meier, the college of pontiffs, had “to rule on all religious matters” and “[a]part from this, the college could exercise political influence by tendering opinions or rulings on infringements of the proper procedures and on how such infringements should be expiated. It had previously been responsible for Roman law and kept magistrates’ rolls.”11 At about the age of