Chance and Natural SelectionJohn BeattyPhilosophy of Science, Vol. 51, No. 2. (Jun., 1984), pp. 183-211.Stable URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28198406%2951%3A2%3C183%3ACANS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-CPhilosophy of Science is currently published by The University of Chicago Press.Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtainedprior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content inthe JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/journals/ucpress.html.Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academicjournals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers,and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact [email protected]://www.jstor.orgSun Aug 19 01:27:28 2007Philosophy of Science June, 1984 CHANCE AND NATURAL SELECTION* JOHN BEATTY? Department of Philosophy Arizona State Universitj Among the liveliest disputes in evolutionary biology today are disputes con- cerning the role of chance in evolution-more specifically, disputes concerning the relative evolutionary importance of natural selection vs. so-called "random drift". The following discussion is an attempt to sort out some of the broad issues involved in those disputes. In the first half of this paper, I try to explain the differences between evolution by natural selection and evolution by random drift. On some common construals of "natural selection", those two modes of evo- lution are completely indistinguishable. Even on a proper construal of "natural selection", it is difficult to distinguish between the "improbable results of natural selection" and evolution by random drift. In the second half of this paper, I discuss the variety of positions taken by evolutionists with respect to the evolutionary importance of random drift vs. natural selection. I will then consider the variety of issues in question in terms of a conceptual distinction often used to describe the rise of probabilistic think- ing in the sciences. I will argue, in particular, that what is going on here is not, as might appear at first sight, just another dispute about the desirability of "sto- chastic" vs. "deterministic" theories. Modem evolutionists do not argue so much about whether evolution is stochastic, but about how stochastic it is. *Received June 1983; revised February 1984. ?This article was written during the academic year 1982-1983, while I was a fellow at the Center for Interdisciplinary Research at the University of Bielefeld, in Bielefeld, West Germany. I was part of a group research project, organized by Lorenz Kriiger, which studied the rise and role of probabilistic thinking in the sciences since 1800. I am very grateful to the staff of the Center, the faculty of the University of Bielefeld, and of course my fellow probabilists for their thoughts and for their friendship. Robert Brandon, Lorenz Kriiger, Elliott Sober, Kenneth Waters, and the referees of Philosoplzy of Science all helped me to clarify the issues discussed here. The residual unclarity distinguishes my contributions from theirs. Some of the residual unclarity must be attributed to Jonathan Hodge's and Alexander Rosenberg's critiques of the notion of "fitness" used here. Their thoughtful critiques have, I must admit, left me a bit confused about my position. Philosophy of Science, 51 (1984) pp. 183-21 1. Copyright 01984 by the Philosophy of Science Association.184 JOHN BEATTY 1. Introduction. Charles Darwin's account of organic form appealed to chance in a way that did not settle well with his critics. As Darwin un- happily reported the opinion of the great scientist-philosopher, John Her- schel, "I have heard, by a round-about channel, that Herschel says my book 'is the law of higgledy-piggledy. ' What exactly this means I do not know, but it is evidently very contemptuous" (Darwin to Lyell, Dec. 12, 1859, in F. Darwin 1887, Vol. 2, p. 37). In time, though, Darwin was praised rather than scorned for his appeal to chance. For instance, looking back at the turn of the century, another great scientist-philosopher, C. S. Peirce, assessed Darwin's contribution in this regard more favorably: The Origin of Species was published toward the end of the year 1859. The preceding years since 1846 had been one of the most pro- ductive seasons-or if extended so as to cover the great book we are considering, the most productive period of equal length in the entire history of science from its beginnings until now. [For] the idea that chance begets order . . . was at that time put into its clearest light. (Peirce 1893, p. 183) Since the turn of the century, however, and especially since the thirties, evolutionists havefurther appealed to chance in ways that Darwin himself might contemptuously have regarded as higgledy-piggledy views of na- ture. Indeed, proponents of one such appeal have coined the term "non- Darwinian evolution" to distance their views from his. Actually, the new appeals to chance have been matters of considerable dispute. And today those disputes are among the liveliest in the already lively field of evo- lutionary biology. The following discussion is an attempt to sort out some of the broad issues involved in these disputes. The most general question at issue con- cerns the relative evolutionary importance of "random drift" vs. natural selection. But what does that mean? In the first half of this paper (Sec- tions 2-3), I will try to make sense of that question. That will involve explaining the sense in which