CAMPBELL HIST 310 - MH-18: Victory in the Pacific

Unformatted text preview:

MH-18: Victory in the PacificMH-18: Pacific Victory - Strategic Overview Naval & Amphibious War – Operational LevelStrategic Opportunity vs. Limited ResourcesSouth Pacific (August’42-December’43) GuadalcanalOperation CartwheelFallback StrategyAir Power’s Role in SW PacificJapanese Response – April 1943Amphibious Campaign- Island hoppingSW Pacific “Island Hopping:” Results & Significance:Central Pacific Campaign (Nov’43-Feb’44) Strategic Aims for PacificConcept of Operations: Two Opposing ConceptsNavy’s Key Role- Sea Power PACFLT Order of BattleSubmarine Campaign- Pacific“Sustained Combat Operations at Sea”Central Pacific StrategyTarawa (Nov’43)- ObjectivesTarawa: ExecutionTarawa: ResultsCentral Pacific Drive ContinuedSW Pacific Operations Linked to Central PacificCentral Pacific => The Marianas Saipan, Tinian & GuamBattle of PI SeaPhilippine InvasionLeyte Gulf -Oct 44- July 45Leyte Gulf: ExecutionHalsey’s BlunderOminous New Tactic RevealedLuzon -Jan 45Final Campaigns- Iwo Jima (Feb-Jun’45)Iwo Jima- Plans & ObjectivesIwo Jima-ExecutionIwo Jima- ResultsOkinawa (April – Jun 1945)Okinawa: Plans & ObjectivesExecution – Easter Sunday-1945Final Assault & ResultsJapan Under SiegeStrategic BombingManhattan ProjectJapan SurrendersWorld War II- AssessmentAssessment-2Assessment-3Backup SlidesTwo separate Pacific Drives- continue (1943-44)PapuaPapua Execution:Papua ResultsSW Pacific Drive- ObjectivesBiak IslandSlide 52Measure of EffectivenessThe Marshalls: Kwajalein (Dec’43)Hollandia’s executionSaipan’s ExecutionGuam & TinianSlide 58Battle of Philippine Sea - ExecutionLeyte Island Assault ContinuesMH-18: Victory in the Pacific2MH-18: Pacific Victory - Strategic Overview Naval & Amphibious War – Operational Level •US Grand Strategy: still Germany “first” => but…–political reality could not be ignored:•Japan bombed US first at Pearl Harbor•American Public demanded revenge on Japan•Result => Grand Strategic objectives & priorities adjusted:–Pacific theater gets higher political & military priority •Also: setting strategic priorities forced leadership:–Allocate scarce resources among competing CINCs•(i.e. forces, logistics and supplies)•Not => best strategic objective or COA to pursue (CINC personalities)•Result: logistics and political considerations drive=>–Allied Strategy => producing ad hoc strategic approach =>–“Dueling” operational strategies in Central & SW Pacific•US called them “complementing strategies;” Brits called them competing3Strategic Opportunity vs. Limited Resources•Following Battle of Midway (June 1942)=> –CINCPAC (Nimitz) still left with only limited resources–A Major limitation for prosecuting war in Pacific theater–Only able to assign 1 UMSC division to secure Guadalcanal–PACFLT ships barely able to protect Australian LOCs•Later US mobilization expanded MPN & logistics=>–Made sufficient forces available to Pacific (by latter half of war)–Enabled US to pursue & adequately support:• 2 separate pronged strategies led by MacArthur (SW) & Nimitz (Central)•As Pacific War was fought => –Number of ships sunk surpassed all previous conflicts–Combined Air/Sea/Land ops accelerated toward the War’s end•But what would finally put an end to the war with Japan?4South Pacific (August’42-December’43) Guadalcanal •Navy & USMC conducted operations in South Pacific =>–Specifically in the Solomon Islands => at Guadalcanal•USMC continued to defend against escalating assaults–Japanese conducted wave upon wave of frontal assaults–Suffered horrendous casualties in process– 15K killed or missing – 9K from disease - 1000 captured•Meanwhile=> Naval battles also fought throughout–Conducted in & around Solomon Islands (Salvo Island- USN defeated)5 Operation Cartwheel •Series of battles then conducted in parallel in SW Pacific•Background:–Casablanca Conference of Jan 1943–Key issue: unity of command in Pacific Theater:–Army (MacArthur) versus–Navy (Nimitz)•Question: who’s in charge & whose strategy will prevail:–(i.e. Given priority for resources & manpower)•Macarthur’s proposed strategy?–Capture ?______________ in 1943 –CJCS response?–Too ?__________ & ?__________6Fallback Strategy •CJCS Compromise:–2 pronged drive converging on Rabaul–Tactical objective: capture or isolate Rabaul•Concept of Operations (Map):–“Bull” Halsey to advance up Solomons to Bougainville–MacArthur advance along New Guinea east coast•Attack New Britain •Then isolate Rabaul•Significance?–PACFLT employed to meet political objectives (PH revenge)–Cartwheel also would become model for entire Pacific campaign7Air Power’s Role in SW Pacific•Key role in Cartwheel & future Leap-frog strategy–Employ CAS for invasion=> troops establish runways=> –Used as FOB & Air Field to attack next island target–Then US starts the cycle over again for next “Island leap”•MacArthur’s top air commander & strategist –MG George C. Kenney–Developed new & innovative tactics– What kind of innovative tactics?•Employed land based air to strike Navy & defenses–Modified B-25s w/8 50 cal MGs in nose –B-25s fly low level sorties against ships•Skip 100# bombs into enemy shipping•Big improvement over past USAAF ops against Japanese ships8Japanese Response – April 1943•Japanese successfully deploy 8th , 17th, & 18th Armies to SW area of operations from China & Japan–Then re-deploy 51st division from Rabaul to New Guinea–Magic forewarns allies of Japanese intent:•Battle of Bismarck Sea –MG Kenny’s modified B-25s make low level & B-17s make high level attacks–Land based Air destroys Japanese troop transports for decisive Allied victory•Impact: loss of this huge armada, loaded with supplies and troops, ended Japanese hopes of retaining control of New Guinea•Also gains US Navy’s reluctant recognition of new Air Force (AF) tactic •Magic also alerts allies of Admiral Yamamoto’s planned air trip:–Action taken by allies?9Amphibious Campaign- Island hopping •Macarthur & Halsey continue duel advance:–Conduct amphibious landings or isolate enemy at:•New Georgia, Bougainville, New Britain, etc.•Tactical & Operational objectives & strategy:–Capture Japanese built air fields (or build them on captured Island)–Occupy & stage for further advance up island chain–Skip & isolate heavily defended


View Full Document

CAMPBELL HIST 310 - MH-18: Victory in the Pacific

Download MH-18: Victory in the Pacific
Our administrator received your request to download this document. We will send you the file to your email shortly.
Loading Unlocking...
Login

Join to view MH-18: Victory in the Pacific and access 3M+ class-specific study document.

or
We will never post anything without your permission.
Don't have an account?
Sign Up

Join to view MH-18: Victory in the Pacific 2 2 and access 3M+ class-specific study document.

or

By creating an account you agree to our Privacy Policy and Terms Of Use

Already a member?