MIT OpenCourseWare http://ocw.mit.edu 21L.017 The Art of the Probable: Literature and Probability Spring 2008 For information about citing these materials or our Terms of Use, visit: http://ocw.mit.edu/terms.THEODICY: ABRIDGEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Trans, G. M. Duncan. New Haven, 1890. Adapted and emended by A.C. Kibel I. It is often said that God did not chose the best in creating this world, because there is evil in it, and whoever does not chose the best is weak or ignorant or bad. Now, I grant that there is evil in this world which God has made, and that it was possible to make a world without evil, or even not to create a world at all, for its creation has depended on the free will of God; but I would point out that the best plan is not always that which seeks to avoid evil, since it may happen that the evil is accompanied by a greater good. I have proved this more fully in my book “Theodicy” by making it clear, by instances taken from mathematics and elsewhere, that an imperfection in the part may be required for a greater perfection in the whole. In this I have followed the opinion of St. Augustine, who has said a hundred times, that God has permitted evil in order to bring about good, that is, a greater good; and that of Thomas Aquinas who said that the permitting of evil tends to the good of the universe. I have shown that the ancients called Adam's fall felix culpa, a happy sin, because it had been retrieved with immense advantage by the incarnation of the Son of God, who has given to the universe something nobler than anything that ever would have been among creatures except for it. For the sake of a clearer understanding, I have added, following many good authors, that it was in accordance with order and the general good that God allowed certain creatures to exercise their liberty, even when he foresaw that they would turn to evil and that he could prevent them; because it was not fitting that, in order to hinder sin, God should act in an irregular manner (and interfere with His own intentions). To overthrow this objection, therefore, it is sufficient to show that a world with evil might be better than a world without evil; but I have gone even farther in my book. I have proved that this universe must be in reality better than every other possible universe. II. It is often said that there is more evil than good in the whole work of God, since there is more evil than good in intelligent creatures. To this I answer, this deduction from a part to the whole, from intelligent creatures to all creatures, supposes without proof that creatures destitute of reason cannot count for much in comparison with those which possess it. But why may it not be that the surplus of good in the nonintelligent creatures which fill the world, compensates for, and even incomparably surpasses, the surplus of evil in the rational creatures? It is true that the value of rational creatures is greater; but, in compensation, the non-rational are beyond comparison the more numerous, and it may be that the proportion of number and quantity surpasses that of value and of quality. Further, there is no need to grant that there is more evil than good in the human race, because it is possible, and in fact very probable, that the glory and the perfection of the blessed are incomparably greater than the misery and the imperfection of the damned, and that here the excellence of the total good in the smaller number exceeds the total evil in the greater number. God is infinite, and the devil is limited; the good may and does go to infinity, while evil has its bounds. It is therefore possible and credible that in the comparison of the blessed and the damned, the contrary of that which I have said might happen in the comparison of intelligent and nonintelligent creatures, takes place; namely, it is possible that in the comparison of the happy and the unhappy, the proportion of degree exceeds that of number, and that in the comparison of intelligent and nonintelligent creatures, the proportion of number is greater than that of value. I have the right to suppose that a thing is possible so long as its impossibility is not proved; and indeed that which I have here advanced is more than a supposition. Finally, there is an inconceivable number of spiritual beings and perhaps of other rational creatures; and no one can prove that in all the City of God, composed as well of spiritual beings as of rational animals without number and of an infinity of kinds, evil exceeds good. And although in order to answer an objection, there is no need of proving that a thing is, when its mere possibility suffices; yet, in my book, I -1 -have also shown that it is a consequence of the supreme perfection of the Sovereign of the universe, that the kingdom of God is the most perfect of all possible states or governments, and that consequently the finite evil there is, is required for the consummation of the immense good which is found there. III. It is argued that anything foreknown is predetermined and God foresees everything; therefore it is impossible not to sin and God is unjust to punish the sinner. I answer by denying that every thing predetermined is necessary; understanding by the necessity of sinning, for example, or by the impossibility of not sinning, or of not performing any action, the necessity with which we are here concerned, that is, that which is essential and absolute, and which destroys the morality of an action and the justice of punishments. That necessity which is contrary to morality and which ought to be rejected, and which would render punishment unjust, is an insurmountable necessity which would make all opposition useless, even if we should wish with all our heart to avoid the necessary action, and should make all possible efforts to that end. Now, it is manifest that this is not applicable to voluntary actions, because we would not perform them if we did not choose to. Also their prevision and predetermination are not absolute, but presuppose the will: if it is certain that we shall perform them, it is not less certain that we shall choose to perform them. These voluntary actions and their consequences will not take place no matter what we do or whether we wish them or not, but rather through what we do and through what we wish to do, which leads to them. And this is involved in prevision and in predetermination, and even constitutes the reason why they can be