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ILLINOIS CS 461 - Evaluating Systems

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Evaluating SystemsReading MaterialOutlineEvaluation GoalsExample: Used CarFormal EvaluationTCSEC: 1983-1999TCSEC Functional RequirementsTCSEC Assurance RequirementsTCSEC ClassesSlide 11Slide 12TCSEC Evaluation processTCSEC Evaluation IssuesInterim Efforts in the ’90sFIPS 140OpenSSL FIPS-140 certificationCommon Criteria – 1998 to todayCC TerminologyProtection Profile (PP)Protection ProfileProduct evaluationCC Functional RequirementsCC Assurance RequirementsEvaluation Assurance LevelsCC Evaluation Process in USEvaluation StatusAlternate PerspectiveCertifying ProcessSSE-CMMCapability Maturity LevelsKey PointsEvaluating SystemsReading Material•Chapter 21 Computer Security: Art and Science•The orange book and the whole rainbow serieshttp://www.radium.ncsc.mil/tpep/library/rainbow/•The common criteriaLists all evaluated protection profiles and productshttp://www.commoncriteriaportal.orgOutline•Motivation for system evaluation•Specific evaluation systemsTCSEC/Orange BookInterim systemsCommon CriteriaEvaluation Goals•Oriented to purchaser/user of system•Assurance that system operates as advertisedExample: Used Car•How do you evaluate a used car?Repair/service records (vendor-supplied documentation)Test drive (self-evaluation)Mechanic (independent verification)•Certified used cars“Get peace of mind with Honda's 150-point inspection”Formal Evaluation•Provide a systematic framework for system evaluationMore consistent evaluationBetter basis for comparing similar product•Trusted third party system for evaluation•Originally driven by needs of government and militaryTCSEC: 1983-1999•Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) also called the Orange BookSpecifies evaluation classes (C1, C2, B1, B2, B3, A1)Specifies functionality and assurance requirements for each class•Functional Model builds onBLP (mandatory labeling)Reference MonitorsTCSEC Functional Requirements•DAC•Object Reuse Sufficient clearing of objects between uses in resource poolE.g. zero pages in memory system•MAC and Labels•Identification and Authentication•Audit requirements increase at higher classes•Trusted PathNon-spoofable means to interact with TCBCtl-Alt-Del in WindowsTCSEC Assurance Requirements•Configuration ManagementFor TCB•Trusted DistributionIntegrity of mapping between master and installations•System ArchitectureSmall and modular•Design Specification – vary between classes•Verification – Vary between classes•Testing•Product DocumentationTCSEC Classes•D – Catch all (aka “you fail”)•C1 – Discretionary ProtectionIdentification and authentication and DACMinimal Assurance•C2 – Control access protectionAdds object reuse and auditingMore testing requirementsWindows NT 3.5 evaluated C2TCSEC Classes•B1 – Labeled Security ProtectionAdds MAC for some objectsStronger testing requirements. Information model of security policy.Trusted Unixes tended to be B1•B2 – Structured protectionMAC for all objects. Additional logging. Trusted Path. Least privilege.Covert channel analysis, configuration management, more documentation, formal model of security policyTCSEC Classes•B3 – Security DomainsImplements full RVM. Requirements on code modularity, layering, simplicity.More stringent testing and documentation.•A1 – Verified protectionSame functional requirements as B3Significant use of formal methods in assuranceHoneywell’s SCOMPTCSEC Evaluation process•Originally controlled by governmentNo fee to vendorMay reject evaluation application if product not of interest to government or doesn’t meet preliminary tests•Later introduced fee-based evaluation labs•Evaluation phasesDesign analysis – no source code accessTest analysisFinal reviewTCSEC Evaluation Issues•Evaluating a specific configurationE.g., Window NT, no applications installed, no networkNew patches, versions require re-certification•RAMP introduced to ease re-certifications•Long time for evaluationSometimes product was obsolete before evaluation finished•Criteria CreepB1 means something more in 1999 than it did in 1989•Narrow scopeOperating systems for military, MLSInterim Efforts in the ’90s•Canadian Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria (CTCPEC)•Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) – Western Europe•Commercial International Security Requirements (CISR) – AmEx and EDS•Federal Criteria – NSA and NISTFIPS 140•Framework for evaluating Cryptographic Modules•Still in Use•AddressesFunctionalityAssurancePhysical securityOpenSSL FIPS-140 certification•OpenSSL certified under FIPS-140Certification obtained Feb 2007•Process took five (!) yearsCertified version is 0.9.7, 3 years old•ProblemsProcess slowPublic comments process used by competitors to derail certificationCommon Criteria – 1998 to today•Pulls together international evaluation effortsEvaluations mean something between countriesEconomies of scale•Three top level documentsCommon Criteria Documents•Describe functional and assurance requirements. Defines Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs)CC Evaluation Methodology (CEM)•More details on the valuation. Complete through EAL5 (at least)Evaluation Scheme•National specific rules for how CC evals are performed in that country•Directed by NIST in USCC Terminology•Target of Evaluation (TOE)The product being evaluated•TOE Security Policy (TSP)Rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected, and distributed in a product•TOE Security Functions (TSF)Implementation of the TSPGeneralization of the TCBProtection Profile (PP)•Profile that describes the security requirements for a class of productsList of evaluated PP’s http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/public/expert/index.php?menu=6•Replaces the fixed set of classes from TCSEC•ISSO created some initial profiles to match TCSEC classesControlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP) corresponds to C2Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP) corresponds to B1Protection Profile•A list of:ThreatsAssumptionsOrganizational policiesObjectivesAssurance requirements•Along with rationale•PP’s are evaluated by CLEFsProduct evaluation•Define a security target (ST)May leverage an evaluated protection profileDefine


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