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CSC 742 Database Management Systems Topic 11 Database Security Spring 2002 CSC 742 DBMS by Dr Peng Ning 1 Security Goals Confidentiality prevent deter detect unauthorized access to information Integrity prevent deter detect unauthorized modification of information Availability prevent deter detect unauthorized denial of service Spring 2002 CSC 742 DBMS by Dr Peng Ning 2 1 Security Mechanisms Methods to achieve the security goals Access control Authentication Encryption Intrusion detection Inference control Spring 2002 CSC 742 DBMS by Dr Peng Ning 3 Outline Access Control in DBMS Discretionary Access Control DAC Mandatory Access Control MAC Spring 2002 CSC 742 DBMS by Dr Peng Ning 4 2 Discretionary Access Control Discretionary Access Control DAC Allow access rights to be propagated from one subject to another Possession of an access right by a subject is sufficient to allow access to the object Spring 2002 CSC 742 DBMS by Dr Peng Ning 5 DAC in DBMS Based on Granting and Revoking of privileges Types of Discretionary Privileges Account level privileges Independent of database content Example GRANT CREATETAB TO Alice Relation level privileges Spring 2002 Based on Access Matrix Model Related to the database content CSC 742 DBMS by Dr Peng Ning 6 3 Access Matrix Model Objects Ri S u b j e c t s U r w own V Rj r r w own rights Spring 2002 CSC 742 DBMS by Dr Peng Ning 7 DAC in DBMS Cont d Relation level privileges Each relation is assigned an owner account The owner of a relation can give privileges on the relation to other users grant The owner can take back privileges revoke Spring 2002 CSC 742 DBMS by Dr Peng Ning 8 4 Examples GRANT INSERT DELETE ON EMPLOYEE DEPARTMENT TO Alice GRANT SELECT ON EMPLOYEE TO BOB WITH GRANT OPTION REVOKE SELECT ON EMPLOYEE FROM Bob GRANT SELECT ON EMPLOYEE SALARY TO Bob Spring 2002 CSC 742 DBMS by Dr Peng Ning 9 View View mechanism Restrict access only to selected attributes and tuples Example CREATE VIEW Researchers AS SELECT Name Bdate Address FROM Employee WHERE Department Research GRANT SELECT ON Researchers TO Bob Spring 2002 CSC 742 DBMS by Dr Peng Ning 10 5 Inherent Weakness of DAC Unrestricted DAC allows unexpected information flow which violates security policy The user can be trusted not to do this deliberately However it is still possible for Trojan Horse Programs to do so A Trojan horse does what a user expects it to do but in addition exploits the user s legitimate privilege to cause a security breach Spring 2002 CSC 742 DBMS by Dr Peng Ning 11 Trojan Horse Example User Alice executes read Relation R Alice r Alice w Relation S Bob r Alice w Program Goodies Trojan Horse write The ACLs do not allow B to read R But B can read the information with the help of the Trojan Horse Spring 2002 CSC 742 DBMS by Dr Peng Ning 12 6 Mandatory Access Control Basic idea put restrictions on access rights Label both the subjects and the objects Allow a subject to access an object only when certain constraints are satisfied Spring 2002 CSC 742 DBMS by Dr Peng Ning 13 MAC Cont d Bell LaPadula BLP Model Simple security Subject S can read object O only if Label S dominates label O Information can flow from label O to label S Intuitively no read up Star property Subjects can write object O only if Label O dominates label S Information can flow from label S to label O Intuitively no write down Spring 2002 CSC 742 DBMS by Dr Peng Ning 14 7 BLP Model Top secret Secret Confidential Unclassified dominance Can flow Spring 2002 CSC 742 DBMS by Dr Peng Ning 15 Trojan Horse Example Again TS User Alice executes read Relation R Alice TS Bob S Alice r Alice w Program Goodies Trojan Horse write S Relation S Bob r Alice w The ACLs do not allow B to read R But B can read the information with the help of the Trojan Horse Spring 2002 CSC 742 DBMS by Dr Peng Ning 16 8 MAC in DBMS Attribute values and tuples are considered as objects Each attribute A is associated with a classification attribute C In some models a tuple classification attribute TC is added to the relation Example Spring 2002 Employee SSN Name BDate Salary Employee SSN CSSN Name CName BDate CBDate Salary CSalary TC Such a relation is called a multi level relation CSC 742 DBMS by Dr Peng Ning 17 MAC in DBMS Cont d Employee SSN CSSN Name CName BDate CBDate Salary CSalary TC Apparent key The set of attributes that would have formed the primary key in a regular single level relation Spring 2002 CSC 742 DBMS by Dr Peng Ning 18 9 Polyinstantiation Several tuples can have the same apparent key value but have different attribute values for users at different classification levels Spring 2002 CSC 742 DBMS by Dr Peng Ning 19 Employee SSN Name Salary Performance TC 111111111 U Smith U 40000 C Fair S S 222222222 C Brown C 80000 S Good C S Employee What class C users see C SSN Name Salary Performance TC 111111111 U Smith U 40000 C Null C C 222222222 C Brown C Null Good C C C S U Employee What class U users see SSN Name Salary 111111111 U Smith U Null Spring 2002 U Performance TC Null U CSC 742 DBMS by Dr Peng Ning U 20 10 Is this possible Employee SSN Name Salary TC Performance 111111111 U Smith U 50000 U Excellent U U 111111111 U Smith U 40000 C Good C C 111111111 U Smith U 40000 C Fair S S 222222222 C Brown C 80000 S C S Spring 2002 Good CSC 742 DBMS by Dr Peng Ning 21 Employee SSN Name Salary Performance TC 111111111 U Smith U 40000 C Fair S S 222222222 C Brown C 80000 S Good C S Employee What class C users see SSN Name Salary Performance TC 111111111 U Smith U 40000 C Null C C 222222222 C Brown C Null Good C C C Class C user UPDATE Employee SET Performance Excellent WHERE SSN 111111111 Spring 2002 CSC 742 DBMS by Dr Peng Ning 22 11 Integrity Constraints for Multilevel relations Entity integrity All attributes that are members of the apparent key must not be null and must have the same security class All other attribute values in the tuple must have a security class greater than or equal to that of the apparent key Null integrity If a tuple value at some security level can be derived from a higher level tuple then it s sufficient to store the higher level tuple Spring 2002 CSC 742 DBMS by Dr Peng Ning 23 12


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NCSU CSC 742 - DATABASE SECURITY

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